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ARTICLES
IMMIGRATION BLAME
David S. Rubenstein*
This Article provides the first comprehensive study of blame in the U.S.
immigration system. Beyond blaming migrants, we blame politicians,
bureaucrats, and judges. Meanwhile, these players routinely blame each
other, all while trying to avoid being blamed. As modeled here, these
dynamics of “immigration blame” have catalyzing effects on the politics,
policies, and structures of immigration law. Yoking key insights from a range
of social sciences, this Article offers unique perspectives on the operation
and design choices of the immigration system. Moreover, through a blame
lens, the terms of debate over amnesty, immigration enforcement, the travel
ban, sanctuary cities, and the U.S. Supreme Court’s plenary power doctrine
come into sharper focus.
In turn, this Article’s descriptive portrayal of immigration blame prompts
some vexing normative questions: Is immigration blame desirable? Can its
inputs and outputs be controlled? If so, how and toward what ends? In
immigration, as elsewhere, blame is a paradox: both functional and
dysfunctional, socially cohering and corrosive. That being so, we should not
aim for a blame-free immigration system. Rather, we should seek ways to
promote the values of immigration blame, while minimizing its more
unsavory manifestations. Toward those ends, this Article prescribes an
“ethics of immigration blame” and suggests ways that law might be
harnessed to mediate some of blame’s pathologies. Today’s sociopolitical
conditions crystallize the need for this work.
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INTRODUCTION
No single theory explains what makes our immigration system tick. But
one idea—blame—has significant untapped potential. Common in our daily
lives, blame registers disapproval of wrongful behavior.1 On a broader scale,
blame is a tool for maintaining social and legal order.2 Indeed, the
anticipation of being blamed causes most people, most of the time, to hew
close to behavioral norms.3 This Article provides the first comprehensive
study of blame in the U.S. immigration system. I will argue that, for better
and worse, blame systemically transfigures the politics, policies, and
structures of immigration law.
At ground level, blame pervades public discourse about migrants. The
nation’s general antipathy toward “criminal aliens,” for instance, is based on
perceptions of their blameworthiness.4 Even lawfully present migrants are
blamed for stealing jobs, harming the environment, not assimilating, and
more.5 Meanwhile, the “Dreamers” who were unlawfully brought to the
country as children are frontrunners for amnesty, in large part, because they
are blameless.6

1. See Angela M. Smith, Moral Blame and Moral Protest, in BLAME: ITS NATURE AND
NORMS 29, 29 (D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini eds., 2013); Lawrence M. Solan,
Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1006–11 (2003)
(offering a psychological explanation for the human impulse to blame); infra notes 42–46 and
accompanying text.
2. See STEPHEN FINEMAN, THE BLAME BUSINESS: THE USES AND MISUSES OF
ACCOUNTABILITY 8 (2015) (arguing that, without blame, moral codes and legal structures
would be unsustainable).
3. See Mark Bovens et al., Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 15 (Mark Bovens et al. eds., 2014) (“As people seek approval . . . they
will adjust their actions and decisions to societal norms and expectations of appropriate
conduct.”); Christopher Hood, Blame Avoidance and Accountability: Positive, Negative, or
Neutral?, in ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNANCE: PROBLEMS AND PROMISES 167, 170 (Melvin J.
Dubnick & H. George Frederickson eds., 2011).
4. See Angélica Cházaro, Challenging the “Criminal Alien” Paradigm, 63 UCLA L.
REV. 594, 599 (2016) (discussing “narratives that pit worthy (hardworking, family-oriented)
immigrants against unworthy (criminal alien) immigrants”); Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner,
The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811–12 (2007)
(explaining that the United States immigration enforcement model uses criminality as a proxy
for unbelonging and undesirability); Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly
Comprehensive Immigration Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2009)
(“[T]he ‘criminal alien’ continues to be one of the most reviled characters of all of U.S. law,
with many enemies and extremely few political friends (even among immigrant rights
advocates).”); infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.A (discussing a range of perceived social harms attributed to migrants).
6. See Matthew La Corte & Melanie Huettman, Congress Needs to Provide Dreamers
with Permanent Protection, HILL (July 20, 2017, 1:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/punditsblog/civil-rights/342953-congress-needs-to-provide-dreamers-with-permanent-protection
[https://perma.cc/UX8R-BLEW] (noting that “Dreamers are a blameless population and
constitute productive members of society”). The innocence of children was also a key theme
in Plyler v. Doe, a landmark decision that constitutionally protected undocumented children
against state and local restrictions on K–12 education. 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982); see also
MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, NO UNDOCUMENTED CHILD LEFT BEHIND: PLYLER V. DOE AND THE
EDUCATION OF UNDOCUMENTED SCHOOLCHILDREN 10–18 (2012) (explaining that the legal
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Why migrants get blamed, and which ones, are important subjects of
concern.7 Missing from the literature, however, is a theoretical model of how
blame dynamics interface with immigration governance writ large. This
Article initiates that project, yoking key insights from political science,
psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy.
As conceived here, “immigration blame” is a sprawling phenomenon.
Beyond blaming migrants, we blame politicians, bureaucrats, and judges.
Meanwhile, these players routinely blame each other, all while trying to
avoid being blamed.8 The results are messy and the implications vast. After
examining the immigration system through the optics of blame, however, it
may be hard to see it any other way.
To start, consider two stylized scenarios. In Scenario One, a legislator’s
key constituents believe that a category of migrants is blameworthy. In
Scenario Two, a legislator’s key constituents believe that a different category
of migrants is blameless. In both scenarios, the legislator has a choice to
make: take favorable action, unfavorable action, or no action toward the
migrants at issue. Intuitively, a legislator’s political risk of upsetting
constituents is higher for granting favorable treatment to the blameworthy
migrants (Scenario One) and lower for granting favorable treatment to the
blameless migrants (Scenario Two).
For reasons explicated below, matters are far more nuanced and complex
in practice. Even in sketch form, however, this introductory salvo has much
to offer. First, it captures two discrete streams of blame: one focused on
blaming migrants, the other focused on blaming public officials. Second,
this opening portrait suggests a relational quality between the blame directed
at migrants and public officials. Namely, as the degree of the migrants’
blameworthiness increases, so does the public official’s risk of political
blame for taking favorable action toward the migrants at issue.
Third, and most important, this thought experiment primes how
immigration blame can have real-world consequences. In the stylized
framing above, one group of migrants was labeled blameworthy (Scenario
One) and the other blameless (Scenario Two). In practice, however, those
judgments are often hotly contested precisely because perceptions of blame
can shape legal and political outcomes.
Specifically, if public officials are averse to being blamed, then policy
victories for blameworthy migrants will be harder to achieve. Meanwhile, as
team behind Plyler had community support, which attracted resources and enabled them to
tell the story of the innocent schoolchildren).
7. See, e.g., GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 36–38 (Anchor Books abr.
ed. 1958) (analyzing use of migrants and other minorities as scapegoats by “in-groups”);
KEVIN JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 3–5 (2003)
(arguing that racial undertones in immigration law are a window for racial undertones in U.S.
society more generally); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 121–32 (2006) (discussing the history
of racial restrictions in immigration law).
8. See infra Part III (cataloging and illustrating a range of blame-avoidance tactics
employed by migrants and public officials pertaining to immigration law).
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public perceptions about a category of migrants improve, officials may be
more inclined to give favorable legal treatment to the migrants at issue.9
Indeed, as the putative blame of a category of migrants approaches zero,
public officials may be blamed for not taking favorable action. These blame
dynamics can also manifest in more dubious ways. For example, public
officials or pundits might concoct false narratives about migrants, hoping to
justify or rally troops around restrictionist immigration policies.
So construed, immigration “blame games” are high-stakes affairs for
public officials and migrants alike.10 For migrants, their societal membership
may depend on public perceptions of their relative blameworthiness. For
government officials, their reputations, careers, and legacies may be on the
line. Migrants and public officials thus have coterminous and oft-competing
incentives to blame others and avoid being blamed.
As detailed herein, the most common blame-avoiding tactics are
rhetorical: narratives, excuses, justifications, blaming others, and framing
techniques. These tactics are utilized by all players in the system, including
migrants, their advocates, public officials, and their spokespersons.11
Meanwhile, public officials often have additional blame-avoiding tactics
available. For example, officials may select immigration policies with an eye
toward avoiding or minimizing blame from their constituents, principals, or
peers. Moreover, officials may renounce their own authority over an issue,
delegate authority to others, or enter governmental partnership arrangements.
Then, if things go wrong, blame can be diffused or lodged elsewhere.12
Welcome to the understudied world of immigration blame. As modeled
here, immigration blame operates along two related dimensions, each with
two prongs. The first dimension is substantive and captures different
channels of blame: the blame directed at migrants (“migrant blame”) and the
blame directed at public officials (“institutional blame”). The second
dimension is process oriented, capturing the sociopolitical dynamics of
placing blame (“blame attribution”) and avoiding, refuting, and mitigating
blame (“blame avoidance”).13 These blame dynamics operate in cycling

9. Whereas migrant blameworthiness may be a reason for taking unfavorable political
action, migrant blamelessness is generally a weaker prompt for favorable action. A reason for
this asymmetry is that the absence of blame is generally neutral, whereas the presence of blame
indicates a negative departure from behavioral norms. See infra Part IV.C (elaborating on this
point in the context of current debates over amnesty and immigration enforcement).
10. See CHRISTOPHER HOOD, THE BLAME GAME: SPIN, BUREAUCRACY, AND SELFPRESERVATION IN GOVERNMENT 7 (2011) (describing the “blame game” as a process in which
“multiple players are trying to pin the responsibility on one another for some adverse event,
acting as blamers to avoid being blamees”).
11. See infra Part II.D (describing these rhetorical devices); Part III.A (describing how
these devices are employed as blame-avoidance tactics).
12. See infra Part III.B–C.
13. The terms “blame attribution” and “blame avoidance” are borrowed from social
sciences. See, e.g., KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME: CAUSALITY,
RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS 174 (1985); R. Kent Weaver, The Politics of Blame
Avoidance, 6 J. PUB. POL’Y 371, 380 (1986).
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feedback, with catalyzing effects on the operation and design choices of the
immigration system.14
To anchor and illustrate these points, this Article surveys today’s headline
immigration disputes—from amnesty to immigration enforcement, from
sanctuary cities15 to “crimmigration” trends,16 from the Trump
administration’s travel bans17 to its zero-tolerance border policy,18 from the
U.S. Supreme Court’s special immigration doctrines19 to lower courts’
frontline decisions. Examining these subjects through a blame lens offers a
unique perspective, which both complicates and complements more
conventional accounts.
Of course, blame cannot explain everything about our immigration system.
No conceptual model can. Blame is a particularly useful frame, however,
because it connects a diverse set of academic theories and disciplines.
Public-choice theory, for instance, depicts government officials and
institutions as support-maximizing actors.20 Avoiding blame from peers,
principals, and constituents—through delegation or otherwise—is a key
ingredient of that strategic modeling.21 Behavioral-economic theories

14. See infra Part IV.
15. The term “sanctuary” generally connotes a local jurisdiction’s policies that restrain
local law enforcement from initiating or voluntarily cooperating with federal immigration
enforcement efforts. For recent and incisive work on the “sanctuary movement,” see generally
Jason A. Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an Era of Mass Immigration
Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Ingrid V. Eagly, Immigrant Protective
Policies in Criminal Justice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 245 (2016); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose
Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Networks, 103 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Christopher N.
Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 58 B.C. L. REV. 1703 (2018).
16. Professor Juliet Stumpf coined the term “crimmigration” in her seminal article on the
subject. See generally Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). There are many dimensions of
crimmigration, but it generally refers to the intersections and conflation of criminal law and
civil immigration law. For an extended treatment, see generally CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA
HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW (2015). For some more specific applications, see also
Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135
(2009) and Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281 (2010).
17. As of this writing, the travel ban is in its third iteration. See Proclamation No. 9645,
82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017); see also Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965, slip op. at 12–
13 (U.S. June 26, 2018); infra notes 90–105, 402–07 and accompanying text (discussing the
travel bans and related litigation).
18. See Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Federal
Prosecutors Along the Southwest Border (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1049751/download [https://perma.cc/9DNM-G9F2] [hereinafter Zero-Tolerance
Memo]; see also infra notes 370–82 and accompanying text (discussing the “zero-tolerance”
policy and the still-unfolding crisis of family separations causally linked to the policy).
19. See generally David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration
Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 583 (2017) (charting the literature and doctrines of
“immigration exceptionalism”).
20. See DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 1 (1991).
21. See Public Choice, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1987)
(explaining that public-choice theory models government as made up of officials who, besides
pursuing the public interest, might act to benefit themselves, possibly at the cost of efficiency
or majoritarian preferences). Through a public-choice lens, one way that blame is avoided is
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explain how cognitive heuristics and biases can lead to irrational judgments,
including blaming attitudes that can distort immigration-related decisions.22
Critical-legal theory posits how race and other social constructs trigger
blaming attitudes toward certain groups of migrants.23 Research in cognitive
and social psychology explains how our emotions, such as anger and
sympathy, affect judgments of blame.24 Building on those ideas, the
burgeoning law-and-emotions literature explains how our emotion-laden
perceptions may be expressed (or mediated) through law and government
institutions.25 Cultural theory, and its extensions, model how variations in
cultural “worldviews” can influence perceptions of harm and responsibility,
and thus whom and what to blame.26 Studies in moral philosophy offer
probing reflections on what blame is and ought to be.27 Of equal importance
are our own life experiences, which teach us much about blame. This
Article’s interdisciplinary approach connects and draws inspiration from
these scattered insights in ways that none alone captures.
Beyond its descriptive appeal, the study of immigration blame prompts
some vexing normative questions. Foremost, is immigration blame
desirable? Can its dynamic levers be harnessed and controlled? If so, how
and toward what ends? This Article grapples with these and related
questions. Despite its ubiquity (or perhaps because of it), blame is generally
derided in the immigration literature. Scholars have been understandably
through delegating decisions. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation,
68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56–57 (1982); see also infra Part III.B.
22. See infra Part II (extending key insights from behavioral economics to the immigration
context).
23. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Post-Racial Proxy Battles over Immigration, in STRANGE
NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION POLICY 229 (Carissa Byrne Hessick &
Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014); Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and Class in U.S.
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 15–22 (2009) (explaining
racial dimensions of immigration law); see also infra notes 156–60 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Emotional Influences on Judgments of Legal Blame: How
They Happen, Whether They Should, and What to Do About It, in EMOTION AND THE LAW:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 45 (Brian H. Bornstein & Richard L. Wiener eds., 2010);
see also infra Part II (discussing the dynamic relationships between heuristics and biases,
emotions, and blame).
25. For an excellent overview of the descriptive and normative dimensions of law-andemotions scholarship, see generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999)
(offering an early landmark collection of law-and-emotions scholarship); Kathryn Abrams &
Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1997 (2010); Terry A.
Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 119 (2006).
26. According to cultural theory, people hold different preferences about how society
should be organized. See generally MICHAEL THOMPSON ET AL., CULTURAL THEORY (1990).
In turn, these “worldviews” can significantly shape judgments about whom to blame, for what,
and why. See MARY DOUGLAS, Risk and Blame, in RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL
THEORY 3, 8, 15–16 (2003). The related “cultural cognition” model connects cultural theory
to cognitive and social psychology. For an overview of these related theories, see generally
Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk, in
HANDBOOK OF RISK THEORY (S. Roeser et al. eds., 2012). See also infra Part II.C (discussing
and extending these theories to immigration blame).
27. See generally BLAME: ITS NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1 (collecting philosophical
essays on the nature and norms of blame).
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preoccupied with blame directed at migrants, which can be nefarious,
misdirected, and disproportionate.28 More generally, the emotive force
behind blame can skew rational judgment and impede social progress.29 This
Article gives voice to these very serious concerns.30 As importantly,
however, this Article offers a partial rehabilitation—immigration blame has
upsides too.31
Broadly speaking, the problems are with unjustified blame, not with blame
per se. When attributed fairly, blame can be a rational sorting device in the
social, legal, and political contexts at issue.32 Choices about which
noncitizens to include, exclude, and remove from the country are the
foundations of any immigration system, which justified blame can rightly
inform. Likewise, choices about which public officials to include, exclude,
and remove from office are the foundations of representative democracy.
When justified, blame can sanction poor government performance and
motivate better outcomes. Moreover, in some contexts, the iterative
dynamics of placing and avoiding blame can promote government
transparency and sharpen lines of accountability. In addition, higher-ups
hoping to avoid blame may delegate authority to public officials who are
better equipped to make the decisions. In these and other ways, blame
dynamics may result in good governance—directly and indirectly, wittingly
and unwittingly.33
To be clear, none of this denies the hazards of immigration blame. But to
make theoretical headway, it is crucial to appreciate that blame is a paradox:
both functional and dysfunctional, socially cohering and corrosive. That
being so, we should not aspire to a blame-free immigration system. Rather,
we should seek ways to promote the values of immigration blame, while
minimizing its more unsavory manifestations. Toward those ends, this
Article prescribes an “ethics of immigration blame” and suggests ways that
law might be harnessed to mediate some of blame’s pathologies.34
At a minimum, we must learn to live with immigration blame. In a very
real sense, immigration debates are sites of contestation about who we are
and wish to be as a nation.35 Especially in a hyperpolarized and “post-truth”
28. See infra Part I.A (discussing what migrants get blamed for and why they get blamed);
see also supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text.
29. See Derk Pereboom, Free Will Skepticism, Blame, and Obligation, in BLAME: ITS
NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1, at 189, 204 (“[B]lame fueled by moral anger arguably
renders it particularly susceptible to errors that threaten to undermine the integrity and
effectiveness of the moral conversation.”); infra Part II (explaining how perceptions can be
systemically wrong and lead to irrational decisions).
30. See infra Part V.C (arguing for an “ethics of immigration blame,” in part to counter
misattributed and pernicious blame).
31. See infra Part V.A (discussing the instrumental values of blame).
32. See infra Part V.A.
33. See infra Parts IV–V (providing a descriptive and normative account of these
dynamics).
34. See infra Part V.C–D (offering a framework and prescriptions for doing so).
35. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 7; DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION:
OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007) (providing a rich historical account of communal
self-idealization and self-protection through American deportation policies).
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world, the dynamics of immigration blame will increasingly matter to the
complexion of our political and social communities.36 This cultural context
lends some urgency to the project ahead. Yet there is a more enduring point,
which is also more fundamental: we have never had a blame-free society.
For better and worse, blame is hardwired to the human condition.37 And, for
better and worse, blame is hardwired to the immigration system too.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of what
migrants and public officials get blamed for. Part II explains the cognitive
and social processes of blame attribution and misattribution. Part III pivots
to blame avoidance. It describes a range of tactics utilized by migrants and
public officials to refuse, diffuse, and deflect blame. Part IV connects these
dynamics, modeling the inputs and outputs of immigration blame, with case
studies drawn from current events. Part V turns to the normative and
prescriptive dimensions of immigration blame. It begins with a discussion
of the values and trade-offs of immigration blame. It then scaffolds an ethics
of immigration blame, and suggests how legalistic nudges may help to curb
some of blame’s deleterious effects.
Before proceeding, I should note that many of the ideas and themes
developed here can be extended to other regulatory contexts, wherever blame
is found. Readers are encouraged to make those connections. For several
reasons, however, this Article fastens on the U.S. immigration system.
Ingroup-outgroup dynamics are breeding grounds for blame, both in
immigration and beyond.38 But immigration, by its very nature, is keyed to
who is “in” and “out”—socially, legally, politically, and physically.39
Immigration thus offers an especially intriguing platform for studying the
intersection of blame and public law.
Moreover, immigration is a subject where passions run high. Especially
in recent years, the saliency of immigration has mobilized voters and
contributed to key electoral outcomes. The historic presidential election of

36. See Post-Truth, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/
post-truth [https://perma.cc/3U59-MY97] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) (defining post-truth as
“[r]elating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”); see also SHAVER, supra note 13,
at 174 (“One person’s judgments of causality, responsibility, and blameworthiness may or may
not agree with the judgments that would have been made by a different perceiver.”).
37. See, e.g., TOM DOUGLAS, SCAPEGOATS: TRANSFERRING BLAME 60, 107–08 (1995)
(describing blame attribution and blame avoidance as “basic human” needs).
38. See id. at 135–48; cf. Eric A. Posner, The Institutional Structure of Immigration Law,
80 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 291 (2013) (asserting that U.S. immigration law is concerned with the
“maximization of the well-being of Americans” without consideration for the interests of
noncitizens).
39. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Rubén G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are
Models of Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 2–3 (1998); Kevin
R. Johnson, Los Olvidados: Images of the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and
Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1163 (“Immigrants, often
viewed as outsiders to the community, periodically have been one of the groups singled out
for blame in the political process.”); see also note 7 and accompanying text.
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Donald Trump is a case in point.40 Now, leading up to the 2018 midterm
elections, a recent poll found that immigration tops the list of important issues
among voters.41 If immigration blame is affecting the composition of our
government representatives and institutions, then, by extension, the stakes of
immigration blame spill across regulatory lines—and indeed, beyond
American borders.
I. BLAME ATTRIBUTION
Studies in social science generally describe blame attribution as hinging
on two perceptions: (1) avoidable harm and (2) responsibility.42 Thus, we
generally blame those whom we think are responsible for causing harm that
could have been avoided if the person being blamed had acted differently.43
Beyond mere judgment, blame is an emotionally charged reaction.44 Unlike
other negative reactions, such as sadness and disappointment, blame is
usually linked to anger, indignation, or resentment.45 Blame thus carries a
certain sting, or normative force, that distinguishes it from other kinds of
negative judgment.46
40. In his bid for the presidency, Trump first shouldered his way through a crowded pack
of Republican primary contenders by blaming Mexican migrants and pledging to build a wall
along the U.S.-Mexico border. See Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid,
WASH. POST (June 16, 2015) [hereinafter Trump Announces Presidential Bid],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trumpannounces-a-presidential-bid/ [https://perma.cc/XND4-MGVD] (transcribing Trump’s
statement, “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good
people.”); cf. Seth McLaughlin, Donald Trump’s Comments Spark Poll Surge, Put 2016
Republican
Hopefuls
on
the
Spot,
WASH.
TIMES
(July
2,
2015),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/2/donald-trump-comments-spark-pollsurge-put-2016-re/ [https://perma.cc/NJ8F-7UBN] (noting rising poll numbers). Encouraged
by his rise in the primary polls, Trump later proclaimed that the United States should ban
Muslim immigrants from entering the country. See Russell Berman, Donald Trump’s Call to
Ban Muslim Immigrants, ATLANTIC (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2015/12/donald-trumps-call-to-ban-muslim-immigrants/419298/ [https://perma.cc/
B3BN-WBJ9]. That generated a second spike in Trump’s primary ratings. Pema Levy, Trump
Soars to New Heights in Poll After Proposing Muslim Ban, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 14, 2015),
http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/12/donald-trump-proposes-ban-muslims-soarsnew-heights-poll [https://perma.cc/RWY3-DMET].
41. See Maria Caspani, Immigration Top Issue for US Voters, Economy a Close Second:
Reuters/Ipsos Poll, AOL (July 8, 2018, 12:00 AM), https://www.aol.com/article/news/
2018/07/08/immigration-top-issue-for-us-voters-economy-a-close-second-reutersipsospoll/23476262/ [https://perma.cc/AV5Q-794T].
42. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 6–7; SHAVER, supra note 13, at vii (noting that blame is
“the outcome of a process that begins with an event having negative consequences, involves
judgments about causality, personal responsibility, and possible mitigation”).
43. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 6–7.
44. See Smith, supra note 1, at 31 (describing blame as “a way of responding
emotionally”). For a discussion of how emotions can influence whether to blame, and whom
(or what) to blame, see infra Part II.B.
45. See Michael McKenna, Directed Blame and Conversation, in BLAME: ITS NATURE
AND NORMS, supra note 1, at 119, 122.
46. See Martha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in
THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 25, at 19, 26–29 (explaining how anger and indignation can
function as an expression of collective moral judgment); Smith, supra note 1, at 29 (explaining
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This Part describes two types of blame that feed the broader phenomenon
of immigration blame. The first is “migrant blame,” which is the assignment
of blame to migrants.47 The second is “institutional blame,” which is the
assignment of blame to public officials.48 To be clear, these types of blame
are not hermeneutically sealed or mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, one
of this Article’s main contributions is to theorize how migrant blame and
Before turning to those
institutional blame dynamically relate.49
complexities, however, it will be useful to elaborate on them separately.50
A. Migrant Blame
Migrants get blamed for a range of perceived harms and wrongs, which
fluctuate and evolve over time depending on economic, social, and political
conditions.51 While a legal violation is often deemed sufficient for migrant
blame to attach, it is not a necessary condition. Rightly or wrongly, even
lawfully present migrants get blamed for societal ills. Today, the most
common tropes of migrant-related harm pertain to crime,52 the economy,53

that blame has a certain “‘force’ or ‘depth’ that goes beyond a mere description of causal
responsibility for a bad result”). But cf. GEORGE SHER, IN PRAISE OF BLAME 88–89 (2006)
(arguing that while indignation and resentment are commonly associated with blame, they are
not essential or necessary, and thus people can blame in more emotionally detached ways).
47. See infra Part I.A.
48. See infra Part I.B.
49. See infra Part IV.
50. While my model is primarily concerned with the blaming of people and institutions,
the targets of blame are often events and situations. For example, we might blame social and
economic disparities, or political dysfunction, or global conditions for perceived harms in our
immigration system. And, indeed, the blaming of events and situations can be highly relevant
to immigration blame. But in most instances, such blame attribution comes in lieu of the
blame that might otherwise be directed at individuals and groups and is captured by my model
to that extent. For further discussion, see infra notes 181–82 and accompanying text.
51. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 31–55 (2014) (drawing
similar connections); see also Johnson, supra note 39, at 1156 (“[T]he average citizen’s only
exposure to the subject of immigration may be hearing immigrants blamed in times of societal
stress for the social ills of the day.”).
52. Jennifer M. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the
“Criminal Street Gang Member,” 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 318–19 (examining the “flawed
but lurid contemporary accounts of the criminality of the immigrant population and the general
presumption of group dangerousness”); Cházaro, supra note 4, at 606–08.
53. In his interview with Kate Snow, former congressman Tom DeLay argued that
immigrants have a “monumental” economic impact: “most of these illegals are drawing
welfare benefits, they’re sending their kids to school, they’re using public services.” Border
States at Forefront of Immigration Debate, MSNBC (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.msnbc.com/
kate-snow/watch/border-states-at-forefront-of-immigration-debate-756174915913
[https://perma.cc/76AC-QHM3]. The economic impact of undocumented immigration, in
particular, is complicated by how economic boons and losses are disparately felt at the federal,
state, and local levels. See PETER SCHUCK & JAMES Q. WILSON, UNDERSTANDING AMERICA:
THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 350 (2008).
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terrorism,54 and cultural threats (for not assimilating, or for just being
different).55
Fear and loathing of migrant outsiders trace to the early Republic, with
Chinese and other Asian migrants among the first blamed for contaminating
American society.56 Ever since, the cultural-threat narrative has weaved
through American history mostly unabated; what changes is the primary
targets of this opprobrium.57 In the early twentieth century, for example, it
was migrant Jews, eastern Europeans, and socialists whom were most
disparaged.58 From the Great Depression, and continuing today, Latinos
have borne the brunt of migrant blame.59 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
Muslims and Arabs have been branded as threats to American values and
national security.60
54. Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
295, 326 (2002).
55. For an extended account of how migrants have been blamed on cultural and racial
grounds, throughout history, see generally JOHNSON, supra note 7. See also infra notes 56–60
and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S.
581, 595 (1889) (upholding a federal ban on the admission of Chinese migrants and remarking
that Chinese migrants “remained strangers in the [United States]” and that a “portion of our
country would be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their
immigration”); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 35–37 (discussing anti-Asian
sociopolitical fervor at the turn of the nineteenth century).
57. See Leo R. Chavez, “Illegality” Across Generations: Public Discourse and the
Children of Undocumented Immigrants, in CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANT “ILLEGALITY”:
CRITIQUES, EXPERIENCES, AND RESPONSES 84, 86 (Cecilia Menjívar & Daniel Kanstroom eds.,
2014); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 31–41 (summarizing some of the trends).
58. In 1924, Congress passed the National Origins Act. National Origins (Johnson-Reed)
Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159, repealed by Immigration & Nationality Act
of 1952, ch. 477, § 201(a), 66 Stat. 163, 175 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151). The
National Origins Act adopted a quota system that drastically capped the number of people
who could immigrate to this country from southern and eastern Europe, including Russia. Id.;
see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–31 (1954) (upholding deportation on the basis of
Communist Party membership); Deborah Sweet Eyler, The Early Female Jewish Members of
the Maryland Bar: 1920–29, 74 MD. L. REV. 545, 546 n.5 (2015) (noting that Congress’s
1924 quota system had the effect of limiting, and was likely intended to limit, the number of
immigrant Jews in America).
59. See Loebardo F. Estrada et al., Chicanos in the United States: A History of
Exploitation and Resistance, in LATINOS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 28, 45–52 (F. Chris
Garcia ed., 1988) (describing how Latinos were blamed and scapegoated during the Great
Depression and “Operation Wetback” in the mid-twentieth century); see also MOTOMURA,
supra note 51, at 37–52 (mapping how the opprobrium directed at Latino migrants has ebbed
and flowed throughout U.S. history, depending on economic and social conditions). For a
notorious example of overt anti-Latino sentiment in more recent times, see Samuel P.
Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 28, 2009, 8:39 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/28/the-hispanic-challenge/
[https://perma.cc/SND242RH], which argues that that the failure of Latino migrants to assimilate into American
culture will lead to America’s “eventual transformation into two peoples with two cultures
(Anglo and Hispanic) and two languages (English and Spanish).”
60. See ROBERT P. JONES ET AL., PUB. RELIGION RESEARCH INST., ANXIETY, NOSTALGIA,
AND MISTRUST:
FINDINGS FROM THE 2015 AMERICAN VALUES SURVEY 4 (2017),
https://www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/PRRI-AVS-2015-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4Q9C-APZN] (“Today, a majority (56%) of Americans agree that the values of Islam are at
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Moreover, it is important to emphasize that blame is not evenly spread
across migrant subpopulations.61 Generally speaking, undocumented
migrants attract more blame than lawfully present ones;62 migrants who
commit crimes tend to attract more blame than law-abiding migrants;63 and
migrants of color tend to attract more blame than their Caucasian
counterparts.64 As will later be explained, these and other blame
stratifications can have dramatic effects on immigration politics and policies.
B. Institutional Blame
Meanwhile, public officials are blamed for innumerable harms relating to
our immigration system. Itemizing all such harms is unnecessary, and
mercifully beyond this Article’s scope. For present purposes, some
generalizations will suffice, which I will elaborate on more fully throughout.
First, public officials may be blamed for their action or inaction.
Regarding inaction, for example, the federal government’s failure to pass
comprehensive immigration reform over the past decade (and counting) is
arguably a blameworthy harm.65 Second, public officials may be blamed for
how they blame others. For example, immigrant advocates commonly blame
public officials for concocting false and pernicious narratives about
migrants.66 Third, public officials may be blamed for case-specific decisions
odds with American values and way of life . . . .”); Akram & Johnson, supra note 54, at 295–
98.
61. See, e.g., Angélica Cházaro, Beyond Respectability: Dismantling the Harms of
“Illegality,” 52 HARV. J. LEGIS. 355, 356–61 (2015) (explaining how the harm and treatment
of undocumented migrants are “disproportionately distributed along lines of race and class”).
62. The act of entering or being in the country unlawfully is, itself, sometimes an
independently sufficient reason to blame undocumented migrants. Whether and to what extent
unlawful entry is a blameworthy harm are issues at the heart of today’s amnesty debates. See
infra Parts III.A.1, IV.C.1.
63. See Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its
Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 109 (2012).
64. Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Alien Language: Immigration Metaphors and the
Jurisprudence of Otherness, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1545, 1577 (2011) (“In contemporary legal
discourse, references to ‘illegal aliens’ facilitate a coded discussion on immigration that . . .
focuses on Mexicans in particular.”); see also JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 161–62 (“The
persistent surfacing of racist statements in the immigration debate, however, clearly
demonstrates that, at some level, racial concerns influence restrictionist sentiments.”).
65. Efforts at comprehensive immigration reform have been percolating in Congress since
at least 2006 and have faltered each time. See, e.g., RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42980, BRIEF HISTORY OF COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM EFFORTS IN THE
109TH AND 110TH CONGRESSES TO INFORM POLICY DISCUSSIONS IN THE 113TH CONGRESS
(2013); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, Only
Gloom Is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/
us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html [https://perma.cc/W45X-FRGF].
66. S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the
Political in Immigration Federalism, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1431, 1448–63 (2012) (discussing how
migrant blame narratives are manufactured by politicians and pundits). Recently, a group of
immigration scholars published a critical study of President Trump’s anti-immigrant narrative
and called it “a complete fiction.” Our Findings, PRESIDENT’S INTENT,
https://www.thepresidentsintent.com/our-findings [https://perma.cc/TZ4V-ZEML] (last
visited Aug. 24, 2018) (“Trump’s story about immigrants boils down to just one narrative. It
is a complete fiction, a dystopic view of a nation under siege.”).
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at the microlevel or for policies and regulations at the macrolevel. This
Article is primarily focused on the latter. But some of the most stirring blame
episodes begin with government decisions at the microlevel, which then
explode into national frenzies.
Take, for example, the brouhaha over sanctuary cities. Although the
sanctuary movement remains ill-defined, it generally connotes a set of state
and local policies that limit or prevent cooperation with federal immigration
enforcement.67 The sanctuary movement is decades old, but it was recently
thrust into the national spotlight after local jailors in San Francisco released
an undocumented migrant from custody without first alerting federal
immigration authorities.68 The released migrant subsequently shot and killed
an innocent woman (by accident, it turned out).69 Within days, all sanctuary
cities were accused of endangering the welfare and security of the nation.70
Then-candidate Donald Trump seized the moment: he blamed the Obama
administration for lax immigration enforcement, states and cities for
interfering with immigration controls, and Mexico for sending us the worst
of their worst.71 Later, in one of his first acts as president, Trump issued an
executive order proclaiming that sanctuary jurisdictions would be ineligible
to receive federal funding.72 Thus, what began as a local decision to release
an undocumented migrant from jail was catapulted onto the national agenda.
The results of these institutional blame episodes are still playing out in
federal court,73 the court of public opinion,74 and legislatures across the
country.75
67. See generally Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 15 (canvassing the range of
sanctuary policies across the country); Lasch et al., supra note 15 (same).
68. Brian Bennett, Republicans Blame San Francisco Pier Killing on Obama’s ‘Reckless’
Immigration Policies, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2015, 2:46 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-deport-shooting-20150714-story.html [https://perma.cc/9URL-AE4K].
69. See Zusha Elinson & Alicia A. Caldwell, Illegal Immigrant Found Not Guilty in San
Francisco Killing, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2017, 10:58 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
illegal-immigrant-found-not-guilty-in-san-francisco-killing-1512091618 [https://perma.cc/
ML5Y-QDZS].
70. See Bennett, supra note 68.
71. See, e.g., Doug Stanglin, Trump: San Francisco Shooting Case for Securing the
Border, USA TODAY (July 4, 2015, 3:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/nation/2015/07/04/donald-trump-san-francisco-killing-whipping-post/29694403/
[https://perma.cc/BYG2-ZV3D]; see also Trump Announces Presidential Bid, supra note 40.
72. See Exec. Order No. 13,768 § 9(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
73. See generally, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir.
2018); City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018).
74. Despite a jury verdict that the shooting was accidental, see supra note 69 and
accompanying text, blame continues to flow unabated. Reacting to the jury’s verdict,
President Trump tweeted: “The Kate Steinle killer came back and back over the weakly
protected Obama border, always committing crimes and being violent, and yet this info was
not used in court. His exoneration is a complete travesty of justice. BUILD THE WALL!”
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Dec. 1, 2017, 3:03 AM), https://twitter.com
/realDonaldTrump/status/936551346299338752 [https://perma.cc/6WQK-2EBY].
75. See, e.g., Kate’s Law, H.R. 3004, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017) (proposing an amendment
to section 276 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to increase penalties for reentry of
removed aliens); COOK COUNTY, ILL. § 46-37 (2018) (allowing detainer compliance where
target of detainer is convicted of a serious or violent felony offense for which he or she is
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The foregoing example, concerning sanctuary cities, also illustrates how
laws and legal structures factor into attributions of institutional blame.76
Recall here that blame generally turns on attributions of (1) avoidable harm
and (2) responsibility. The law can inform each of these subsidiary
judgments. For example, President Obama’s and President Trump’s
respective immigration policies have been heavily critiqued on legal
grounds.77 Those legal violations, or their effects, may be perceived as
avoidable harm. In general, there is no preset amount of institutional blame
that attaches when public officials violate the law. It depends on the
circumstances, including which public official violated which law, in what
way, and to what effect.
Moreover, the law can be highly relevant to institutional responsibility.
That is because laws and legal structures can rule in, or rule out, which public
officials are responsible for which perceived harms. Pinning down lines of
responsibility can be challenging in many areas of law. Immigration law is
somewhat unique in this regard, however, because the Supreme Court’s
normal constitutional doctrines do not always apply.78 Some familiarity with
the Court’s exceptional immigration doctrines will thus be useful here and
important to later parts of the discussion.79
To start, the Constitution does not explicitly vest a federal immigration
power.80 Indeed, for the first century of the Republic, immigration was
regulated primarily by the states and not by the federal government.81 In the
mid-1800s, however, the Supreme Court effectively flipped the script. In a
series of federalism cases, the Court interpreted the Constitution to vest the
nation’s immigration power exclusively in the federal government.82 Still

currently in custody); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 9-131 (2018) (including
numerous crime-based exceptions to noncompliance with detainers); see also CAL. GOV’T
CODE §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a)(4) (West 2018) (same); infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing state and
local sanctuary laws).
76. See infra Part IV.B–C (elaborating on how law is both an input and output of
institutional blame).
77. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (U.S. June 26, 2018); United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (affirming, without opinion, the Fifth Circuit’s
preliminary injunction of DAPA in Texas v. United States, 805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015)).
78. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 584 (“Immigration law is famously
exceptional.”).
79. See infra Parts III.C, IV.C.3, V.D.
80. The Constitution expressly vests Congress with the power to establish uniform
naturalization laws. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Whereas naturalization involves questions of
citizenship, immigration law mostly concerns the admission, expulsion, and treatment of
noncitizens in the country and is arguably a much more expansive power. That is not to say
that Congress does not have immigration power; only that the Constitution does not expressly
grant that power to Congress.
81. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1841–80 (1993).
82. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280–81 (1875) (striking down a state
regulation that imposed a bond for arriving alien passengers deemed to be “lewd and
debauched”); Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 273–75 (1875) (striking down a
requirement that a bond be posted by shipmasters for arriving alien passengers); see also
Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 600, 603–06 (discussing the origins and import
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today, states are generally prohibited under the “exclusivity doctrine” from
directly regulating the admission and expulsion of migrants to and from the
United States.83
While the exclusivity doctrine restricts state immigration laws, it says
nothing about the scope or division of immigration power among the three
federal branches. In the late 1800s, the Supreme Court ruled that the federal
political branches had plenary (i.e., complete) authority to regulate the
admission and expulsion of migrants.84 Under this so-called plenary power
doctrine, the Court deemed itself powerless to review Congress’s or the
Executive’s immigration decisions for alleged constitutional violations.85
To a surprising extent, the plenary power doctrine is still good law today.86
Indeed, that is what makes it special: instead of receiving heightened judicial
scrutiny, constitutional challenges to federal immigration policies remain
“largely immune” from judicial review.87 Thus, federal immigration laws
that allegedly violate equal protection, substantive due process, and First
Amendment rights, garner very little scrutiny from the Court.88 More
generally, the plenary power doctrine results in a regulatory regime that, in
the Court’s own words, “would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”89
For those wondering how President Trump’s travel ban survived Supreme
Court review,90 the plenary power doctrine is at least partly the reason why.91
As of this writing, the travel ban is in its third iteration, in the form of
of the exclusivity doctrine); id. at 618–20 (canvassing and contrasting a number of academic
treatments of the exclusivity doctrine).
83. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363–65 (1976) (delineating the contours of the
modern exclusivity doctrine). There are some exceptions to the exclusivity doctrine’s general
prohibition. See infra notes 110–17 and accompanying text (discussing the delegated and
residual authority states have to pass laws pertaining to noncitizens).
84. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604
(1889) (upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 on the ground that the federal
government had complete authority to exclude immigrants on any basis, including race or
nationality); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705–08, 713 (1893)
(extending this reasoning to the federal political branches’ deportation laws).
85. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604–09; see also Stephen H.
Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP.
CT. REV. 255, 255 (coining the term “plenary power doctrine”); Hiroshi Motomura,
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 (1990).
86. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 594–99 (discussing the contours of
the modern plenary power doctrine, including recent cracks in its facade).
87. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“Our cases ‘have long recognized
the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” (quoting
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953))).
88. See, e.g., id.; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)
(reifying Congress’s virtually impenetrable discretion, stating: “[w]hatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”).
89. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
90. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965 (U.S. June 26, 2018).
91. See David S. Rubenstein, Immigration Symposium: The Future of Immigration
Exceptionalism, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/
immigration-symposium-future-immigration-exceptionalism/
[https://perma.cc/CT6Z6ESV]; see also infra notes 92–94, 405–07 and accompanying text.
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Proclamation No. 9645 (“the Proclamation”).92 Relying on a broadly worded
delegation of power from Congress to the president,93 and citing nationalsecurity concerns, the Proclamation restricts entry of nationals from certain
countries, most of which have Muslim-majority populations.94
The Proclamation was challenged on a number of legal grounds, including
alleged violation of the Establishment Clause.95 Generally speaking, the
Establishment Clause forbids the government from disfavoring or favoring
one religion over another.96 In Trump v. Hawaii,97 the crux of the plaintiffs’
claim was that the Proclamation was motivated by animus toward Muslims.98
In support, plaintiffs cited many examples of public statements made by
Donald Trump, both while campaigning for the presidency and after taking
office.99 In much of the rhetoric at issue, Trump blamed Muslims for
endangering the safety and welfare of the American people.100
The plaintiffs might have prevailed under the Court’s “reasonable
observer” standard, which is the test normally employed by the Court in
Establishment Clause cases.101 Tellingly, however, the Court declined to
apply that standard. The Court began by explaining that “[t]he case before
us differs in numerous respects from the conventional Establishment Clause
claim.”102 Reifying the plenary power doctrine, the Court stressed: “For
more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and
exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised
by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial
control.’”103 At most, the Court explained, “rational-basis” review
applied.104 And, under that highly deferential standard, the plaintiffs’
Establishment Clause claim fell short.105
Considered separately, or together, the Court’s plenary power and
exclusivity doctrines can inform which public officials to blame for
immigration-related harms. For instance, if the federal government has a
monopoly over immigration regulation (per the exclusivity doctrine), the
92. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012) (granting the president authority to restrict the entry of
aliens whenever he finds that their entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States”); Trump, slip op. at 16 (remarking that the statutory text “exudes” deference to the
president, and holding that the Proclamation fell within statutory bounds).
94. See Trump, slip op. at 12–13 (discussing the Proclamation and its prior iterations);
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. at 45,165–67.
95. See Trump, slip op. at 12; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
96. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“[T]he
First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion . . . .”);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
97. No. 17-965 (U.S. June 26, 2018).
98. Id. at 15.
99. Id. at 37–39 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
100. See id.
101. Cf. id. at 36 (citing McCreary County. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 862, 866
(2005)).
102. Id. at 24 (majority opinion).
103. Id. (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
104. Id. at 25.
105. Id. at 25–28.
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polity might be less apt to hold state officials responsible for perceived
immigration-related harms. Meanwhile, if immigration power is lodged
almost exclusively in the federal political branches (per the plenary power
doctrine), then the polity might be less apt to blame courts for federal
immigration failures. In these ways, the plenary power and exclusivity
doctrines could potentially promote more accurate attributions of
governmental responsibility, and thus more accurate assignments of
institutional blame.
In important respects, however, the Court’s exceptional immigration
doctrines never fully closed the loop on where the constitutional buck
stops.106 Regarding federal immigration authority, the existence of two
potentially accountable institutions—Congress and the Executive—suffices
for a blame-game quorum, as each may claim the other is responsible for
faults in the immigration system.107 What is more, Congress delegates
considerable amounts of immigration authority and discretion to various
federal agencies,108 which compound the possibilities for blame attribution
(and blame avoidance) among Congress, the president, and administrative
officials.
Further complicating matters, the exclusivity doctrine is not as tight as it
once was or could be.109 Of significance, the Court has not employed the
doctrine to preclude the federal government from devolving its immigration
authority to state and local jurisdictions.110 For example, Congress has given
states the option to deny state-administered welfare benefits to certain
categories of noncitizens.111 Further, Congress has allowed for the
deputation of state and local officials to enforce federal immigration laws.112

106. One line of the Court’s plenary-power cases suggests that the Executive has inherent
and broad immigration power. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S.
537, 544 (1950). Meanwhile, another line of cases suggests that the Executive’s power over
immigration is generally no different than in other areas of law, with Congress as the fount of
lawmaking authority and delegation serving as the primary mechanism for allocating power
elsewhere. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 (1983).
107. Cf. HOOD, supra note 10, at 43 (“[S]ystems of divided government and complex multilevel government structures may offer more opportunities for blame-shifting in the sideways
and up-and-down directions than simpler structures”).
108. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economics of Immigration Law, 2 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 1, 45–50 (2012) (describing the fragmentation of immigration authority within
the executive branch).
109. See infra notes 110–17 and accompanying text.
110. This practice is not without its critics. See generally Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws
in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965 (2004) (lamenting and criticizing the
federal government’s devolution of immigration authority to state and local officials); Michael
J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection,
and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001).
111. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104–193, §§ 400–51, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–77.
112. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012); infra notes 287–89 and accompanying text (discussing
federal-state enforcement arrangements).
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How subfederal officials use, or do not use, their conferred authority can
attract institutional blame.113
Moreover, states have a residue of inherent power to enact laws that pertain
to migrants.114 As interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court, the
exclusivity doctrine forbids state laws that directly govern the admission and
expulsion of migrants, but does not prohibit state laws that otherwise pertain
to noncitizens residing in their jurisdiction.115 Thus, unless federally
preempted, states and localities have some leeway to pass laws that pertain
to migrants (e.g., regarding in-state tuition, driver’s licenses, and publicsector jobs).116 Consequently, state and local officials are key players in the
immigration federalism landscape. Especially over the past decade,
subfederal officials have been targets of institutional blame for their actions
and omissions in the immigration arena.117 The imbroglio over sanctuary
cities is just one of many flare-ups.118
In sum, there is plenty of institutional blame to go around and plenty of
public officials to share in it. These structural conditions are very
consequential. As the number of potential targets of institutional blame
expands, the opportunities for attributing, deflecting, and avoiding blame
multiply exponentially.
II. PERCEPTIONS AND MISPERCEPTIONS
This Part explains the psychology and sociology of blame. Key insights
from these disciplines explain how perceptions are formed and, as
importantly, how perceptions can be systemically wrong.
Leading theories in psychology posit that judgment formation is the
product of a “dual-process” structure: “System One,” which is a fast,
instinctive, intuitive, and emotional system; and “System Two,” which is a
slow, reflective, controlled, and effortful system.119 Important for present
113. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text; infra notes 414–15 and accompanying
text.
114. The government’s official position on immigration enforcement is that it is both
devolvable to subfederal actors and, moreover, that unless preempted, states have some
inherent authority to enforce at least certain aspects of immigration law. See Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen. of the U.S., to Attorney Gen. of the U.S. 13 (Apr.
3, 2002), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K33G-YVA5].
115. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976).
116. See Kerry L. Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1625, 1644 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made a sharp distinction between
immigration law, which regulates the exclusion and deportation of aliens, and alienage law,
which regulates their presence here”); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in
Immigration, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 576 (2008).
117. See PRATHEEPAN GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW
IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 57–86 (2015) (surveying the unprecedented uptick in state and
local laws pertaining to noncitizens); Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 576.
118. See supra notes 67–75 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.C.4.
119. See generally DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken &
Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (providing a collection of articles on dual-process theories); DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 14, 24, 28 (2011).
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purposes, studies in cognitive and social psychology have shown that
judgments relating to blame are generally dominated by System One’s
intuitive and reflexive pathways.120 System Two’s slower and more
reflective pathways are available as a mental check. But owing to certain
individual and group tendencies, our first impressions about whether and
whom to blame generally stick.121
These insights, which I elaborate on further below, are essential for
understanding how blame can have transformative effects—and not always
rational ones—on the immigration system’s operation and design. Just as
blame can be misattributed to migrants, blame can be misattributed to public
officials: for instance, if the general polity fails to link policymakers to
choices they have made or, conversely, if the polity makes a causal link
between harm and responsibility where none exists.
A. Heuristics and Biases
Studies in cognitive psychology have long shown how humans use
heuristics and biases to digest complex questions.122 Whereas heuristics are
instinctual strategies for processing information, biases reflect those
tendencies in predictable ways.123 Heuristics and biases, which operate in
System One, can be valuable for making efficient decisions.124 In some
cases, however, these cognitive tools can lead to severe and systemic errors
in judgment, which in turn can lead to irrational decisions.125 Moreover, at
the group level, heuristics and biases can “fuel mass delusions that have large
consequences for regulatory policy.”126
120. See, e.g., Feigenson, supra note 24, at 45–46; see also infra Part II.B (discussing how
emotions, which are System One cognitions, relate to blame attribution).
121. See, e.g., Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126
PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 556–74 (2000); Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational
Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814, 817
(2001) (offering a “social intuitionist model” of moral judgment, and arguing that fast-track
moral intuitions—rather than slow-track deductive moral reasoning—are generally what
dictate social moral judgments); see also Neal Feigenson & Jaihyun Park, Emotions and
Attributions of Legal Responsibility and Blame: A Research Review, 30 LAW HUM. BEHAV.
143, 145–48 (2006).
122. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (presenting early studies about human judgment in the face of
uncertainty). For an updated account, see generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 119.
123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531, 532 (2005)
(“The use of heuristics gives rise to intuitions about what is true, and these intuitions
sometimes are biased, in the sense that they produce errors in a predictable direction.”).
124. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51
STAN. L. REV. 683, 704 (1999).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 704–05. For applications of these ideas to immigration, see, for example,
Mary De Ming Fan, The Immigration-Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake,
10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 37–40 (2007); Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 66, at
1444–46. For nonimmigration examples, see, for example, Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman,
More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1291, 1313–14 (2003) and Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
751, 751 n.4, 752 n.9 (2003).
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1. Heuristics
Three heuristics, in particular, are central to perceptions relating to
immigration blame. First, through the availability heuristic, people assess
the frequency and probability of events with reference to how easily instances
of the occurrence come to mind.127 Statistically, for example, it is quite rare
for undocumented migrants to commit violent crimes.128 However, if people
can readily recall media accounts of those events, the availability heuristic
might cause audiences to believe that such crimes occur, or will occur, more
often than statistical base rates suggest. The availability heuristic can lead to
erroneous judgments because the ease of recalling an event need not have
any correlation to the event’s actual propensity.129
Second, under the representativeness heuristic, people draw conclusions
about the probability of events or things with reference to how similar (or
not) the tested subject is compared to a reference subject.130 Put otherwise,
judgments of probability are influenced by assessments of resemblance.
Under the representativeness heuristic, preexisting stereotypes may guide a
person’s judgment insofar as the person compares the known features of the
target subject with what stereotypes make salient about the reference
group.131 Like other mental shortcuts, the representativeness heuristic does
not always lead to false correlations. But it can make such errors more
likely.132
Third, the affect heuristic is a mental shortcut through which judgments
are influenced by moods and emotions, such as anger, fear, and happiness.133
Under this heuristic, information about stimuli in the perceiver’s
environment is tagged with a mood or emotion, which in turn influences how
perceptions and judgments are formed.134 One of many iterations of the

127. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 122, at 3,
11–14 (discussing the availability heuristic).
128. See Kevin R. Johnson, It’s the Economy, Stupid: The Hijacking of the Debate over
Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (or the War on Drugs, War on Terror,
Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 592 (2010) (“Although immigrants are often
blamed for crime, ample evidence demonstrates that the crime rates among immigrants are no
greater—and often less—than among the general population.”); From Anecdotes to Evidence:
Setting the Record Straight on Immigrants and Crime, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. (July 25, 2013),
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/anecdotes-evidence-setting-record-straightimmigrants-and-crime-0 [http://perma.cc/JH8M-6E4C] (presenting evidence that immigrants
are no more likely to engage in criminal conduct than nonimmigrants).
129. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 707.
130. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 752.
131. KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 148–51.
132. See id.
133. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397, 397 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
134. Id. at 409–15; see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 41–51 (2001) (discussing how emotional judgments and
impressions may be false or mistaken); Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and
Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 959, 971–72 (2003) (discussing “affect-asinformation” as one of several ways that emotions inform judgments of blame).
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affect heuristic, relevant to immigration blame, is the outrage heuristic.135
Under this heuristic, punishment judgments are made to turn on the
outrageousness of the act at issue.136 The difficult question, “what should
the appropriate punishment be?” is subconsciously answered by a simpler
question—to wit, “how outraged am I by the conduct in question?”137 I will
return to the affect heuristic and the significance of blame-related emotions
in more detail below.138
2. Biases
In tandem with heuristics, biases are System One tendencies that can lead
to misjudgments. Negativity bias is perhaps the most important because it
makes “bad stronger than good” across a range of political and social
contexts relevant here.139 One manifestation of negativity bias makes people
more prone to find fault than to give credit, with important implications for
how and when people vote.140 Another well-known manifestation of
negativity bias is “loss aversion,” which causes people to feel losses more
intensely than gains.141 Further, negativity bias has recently been linked to
political affiliation.142 Those with higher degrees of negativity bias are more
sensitive to negative stimuli and social change, and thus tend to favor more
conservative policies.143 Meanwhile, individuals with lower negativity bias
are less wary of change, which can make them feel more comfortable with
progressive policies.144
Negativity bias has wide implications for immigration blame. As just one
of many examples, negativity bias may cause people to feel more
dissatisfaction with the size of our enormous undocumented population than
satisfaction with record-breaking deportations.145 If so, negativity bias can
135. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra
note 133, at 49, 63.
136. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 123, at 538.
137. Sunstein, supra note 123, at 538. This sort of substitution—of a hard question with
an easier one—is the general way that System One heuristics operate. See id. at 532–33, 538.
138. See infra Part II.B.
139. See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 323,
354–55 (2001); Paul Rozin & Edward B. Royzman, Negativity Bias, Negativity Dominance,
and Contagion, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 296, 298–99 (2001).
140. HOOD, supra note 10, at 10; Weaver, supra note 13, at 371.
141. See JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 122, at
300–05; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 346–47 (1984).
142. See generally J. R. Hibbing et al., Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie Variations
in Political Ideology, 37 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 297 (2014).
143. Shalom H. Schwartz, Negativity Bias and Basic Values, 37 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 328,
328 (2014).
144. See Gian Vittorio Caprara et al., Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and
Political Choice, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 1, 25 (2006).
145. See Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW
RES. CTR. (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-aboutillegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/98ZX-W2AC] (estimating the unauthorized
immigrant population at 11.3 million); Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported More People
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have a one-way ratcheting effect on public perceptions about the
government’s ability to control immigration flows. In turn, public officials
may be more inclined to take blame-avoiding action than credit-claiming
action, with downstream effects on immigration structures and policy.146
Another cognitive hiccup central to immigration blame is confirmation
bias.147 When presented with conflicting information, people tend to
foreground information that comports with their preexisting beliefs.148 Thus,
owing to confirmation bias, people who already think that migrants steal
American jobs are more likely to internalize cohering reports and reject
nonconforming information.
Confirmation bias has also been linked to two additional phenomena
relevant to immigration blame. Specifically, confirmation bias can lead
people to engage in “blame validation,” whereby blamers exaggerate
supporting information to lock in their preexisting judgments and, in the
process, subconsciously avoid blaming themselves or third parties who may
be more deserving of that opprobrium.149 In a partly overlapping
phenomenon, “cognitive dissonance” theory posits that when a person’s selfworth or belief system is threatened, they may release the psychological
tension through the cathartic act of blaming others.150 Those at the fringe of
society—especially undocumented migrants of color—tend to be easy
outlets.151 As put by Dean Kevin Johnson: “generation after generation, the
United States has turned to the cure-all of blaming the ‘foreigner’ for
domestic troubles.”152
Racial bias can also infect perceptions relating to blame.153 In the
immigration context, racial bias is most commonly associated with the blame
than Any Other President, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/obamas-deportation-policy-numbers/story?id=41715661
[https://perma.cc/U958KE6Z] (“Between 2009 and 2015 [the Obama] administration . . . removed more than 2.5
million people through immigration orders . . . .”).
146. Cf. Weaver, supra note 13, at 393–95.
147. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 101, 107
(2007) (“[R]ather than update their prior beliefs based on new information, [people] tend to
evaluate the persuasiveness of new information based on its conformity to their experience.”);
Jonathan J. Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence
Quality, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47 (1993).
148. See Koehler, supra note 147, at 47; Sunstein, supra note 126, at 762.
149. Experimental studies by Mark Alicke and associates indicate that subjects who
spontaneously evaluate agents’ behavior unfavorably are apt to exaggerate agents’ causal
control and any evidence that might favor it while de-emphasizing counterevidence. See Mark
D. Alicke et al., Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control, 108 J. PHIL. 670, 697
(2011); Alicke, supra note 121, at 556–74.
150. For the classic work on cognitive dissonance, see generally LEON FESTINGER, A
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). The idea has often been extended to explain
scapegoating of putatively innocent groups, including migrants. See DOUGLAS, supra note 37,
at 115–17; JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 50–52; McLeod, supra note 63, at 164–68.
151. See DOUGLAS, supra note 37, at 132–40.
152. See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 87.
153. Stereotyping occurs when we overestimate the prevalence of a trait or characteristic
in other people and assume that more members of the group possess the trait or characteristic
than really do. See JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 204–08 (1988).

148

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

attributed to migrants of color.154 But such bias can also distort public
perceptions of government officials, as arguably occurred, for example,
against President Obama.155 Like other biases, racial bias can occur
subconsciously and without ill intent.156 Understandably, most immigration
restrictionists—including our sitting president—vehemently deny that their
anti-immigration ideology is based on race.157 Instead, they cite to raceneutral reasons, such as crime, the economy, and national security.158 These
race-neutral reasons may be sincerely held.159 Through a critical-race lens,
however, these other reasons are proxies for conscious or subconscious
bias.160
Importantly, racial bias can merge with other mental shortcuts, with
compounding effects. For instance, if audiences can easily recall accounts
of Latino migrants committing drug crimes, then the availability heuristic
might lead those audiences to believe that Latinos are more prone to commit
such crimes than statistical base rates show.161 And, if people are already
predisposed to think so, confirmation bias might lead audiences to accept
(and maybe even seek) conforming reports.162 Meanwhile, owing to
154. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra note 160 and accompanying text.
155. Although President Obama “didn’t view racism as a major component of mainstream
Republican opposition to his policies,” those that worked in the Obama White House “do
identify race as a factor in consistent Republican efforts to stymie Obama’s agenda in
Washington.” Kevin Liptak, Obama’s Candid Reflections on Race, CNN (Dec. 7, 2016,
1:28 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/07/politics/obama-race-legacy/index.html
[https://perma.cc/HXQ8-EFLY]; see also Terence Samuel, The Racist Backlash Obama Has
Faced
During
His
Presidency,
WASH.
POST
(Apr.
22,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/obama-legacy/racial-backlash-againstthe-president.html [https://perma.cc/3FTF-JTZ4].
156. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A Dialogue,
44 GA. L. REV. 1, 75 (2009) (“Xenophobia can be a cover for cruder forms of either conscious
or unconscious bigotry, and all too often it is Latinos or Latinas who are singled out.”).
157. Making headlines, President Trump questioned proposed immigration protections for
people from Haiti and some African nations, asking in a White House meeting “why he should
accept immigrants from ‘shithole countries’ rather than from places like Norway.” Julie
Hirschfeld Davis et al., Trump Alarms Lawmakers with Disparaging Words for Haiti and
Africa, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/us/politics/trumpshithole-countries.html [https://perma.cc/YJ6C-4YXD]. When asked days later whether he is
racist, President Trump said, “No, I’m not a racist. I am the least racist person you have ever
interviewed.” Aileen Graef, Trump: ‘I Am Not a Racist,’ CNN (Jan. 15, 2018, 12:13 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/14/politics/donald-trump-racist/index.html [https://perma.cc/
KA9N-2C7L].
158. See supra Part I.A.
159. Cf. D. C. McAllister, No, Trump’s Immigration Order Isn’t Racist or Reminiscent of
the Holocaust, FEDERALIST (Jan. 30, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2017/01/30/no-trumpsimmigration-order-isnt-racist-reminiscent-holocaust/ [https://perma.cc/WC49-B53G] (“Just
because a racist is skeptical of refugees from terrorism-exporting countries for his own twisted
reasons doesn’t mean all Republicans who support the policy are racist.”).
160. See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 7 (“The use of proxies to discriminate obscures the true
inequality of the law and allows for the plausible denial of a discriminatory intent while
ensuring discriminatory results.”); Legomsky, supra note 156, at 75 (“Bigotry often drives
people to take positions on illegal immigration that they know would be socially unacceptable
if articulated in explicit racial terms.”).
161. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text (discussing the availability heuristic).
162. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text (discussing confirmation bias).
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negativity bias, audiences are likely to feel exponentially more displeasure
with “bad” Latino migrants than satisfaction with the “good” ones.163
Consider, in this light, Trump’s stirring remarks during his presidential bid:
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I
assume, are good people.”164
B. Emotions
A growing body of psychological research explains how emotions are
integral to information processing and judgment formation. The definition
of “emotion” is not entirely settled, in part because scientists’ understanding
of how the human brain works is constantly evolving.165 For present
purposes, I use the term emotion in a conventional sense, to mean instinctive
or intuitive feelings that assist people in appraising and reacting to stimuli in
their surrounding environment.166 Emotions influence human thinking in at
least four ways that pertain to blame attribution and misattribution.
First, as already mentioned, emotional states offer information about the
targets of our judgment through the affect heuristic.167 Thus, for example,
people who feel angry use that emotion as an informational cue, or signal,
that something bad has happened for which someone is responsible.168 Just
as we might intuit that where there is smoke there is fire, so too might we
intuit that when we feel angry (the emotion) there is someone to blame (the
emotional cause). In this cognitive pathway, anger is prior to blame.
Second, anger can follow or cognitively mesh with blame.169 Suppose, for
example, that a blamer perceives that a blamee is responsible for some
avoidable harm. Whatever led the blamer to those judgments can also lead
to or merge with the structural predicates of anger.170 To be clear, anger and
blame do not always coincide—we can blame without being angry and feel
angry without blaming. But the relationship between anger and blame is
163. See supra notes 139–46 and accompanying text (discussing negativity bias).
164. Trump Announces Presidential Bid, supra note 40.
165. See Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L.
& SOC. SCI. 161, 163 (2012).
166. Id.; see also Feigenson, supra note 134, at 962 (explaining how emotions signal
changes in the environment that are important to the person experiencing the emotion and can
“help that person choose among and coordinate competing goals and values”).
167. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text (discussing the affect heuristic).
168. See generally Gerald L. Clore et al., Affective Causes and Consequences of Social
Information Processing, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 323 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. &
Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994) (explaining how affects that are external to the judgment
target can be extended and mistakenly attributed to the target judgment); Feigenson, supra
note 134, at 964, 968.
169. See BERNARD WEINER, JUDGMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITY: A FOUNDATION FOR A THEORY
OF SOCIAL CONDUCT 186–98 (1995) (capturing decades of research showing that judgments
of responsibility mattered to the perceiver’s emotional response); Brian M. Quigley & James
T. Tedeschi, Mediating Effects of Blame Attributions on Feelings of Anger, 22 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1280, 1281–82 (1996).
170. See Solan, supra note 1, at 1009 (“What triggers blame and what triggers such
emotions as anger seem very similar.”).
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often fluid, reciprocal, and mutually reinforcing because the triggers of anger
and blame substantially overlap.171 To wit, both anger and blame are
consistent with perceptions that the target of judgment is responsible for
some avoidable harm.172 By contrast, if the perceiver believes that someone
has been harmed for reasons beyond that person’s control, the perceiver may
emerge with a different emotion, such as sympathy or sadness. Compared to
anger, these other negative emotions tend to correlate with different attitudes
and behaviors, such as forgiveness or aiding the victim.173
Third, emotions can influence how we process information through
System One and System Two. Some emotions, like anxiety and sadness,
cause people to feel uncertain about a situation.174 That uncertainty, in turn,
tends to trigger deliberative and effortful System Two thinking.175 By
contrast, anger makes a person feel more certain about a situation.176 In turn,
that certainty makes System One processes more salient because there is no
self-felt need for System Two’s mental check.177
To be sure, people can (and often do) have rational reasons available to
support System One emotional judgments. Research shows, however, that
such rationalization is often arrived at post hoc.178 Thus, even when we think
that our System Two processes did the evaluative work, our System One
pathways may have predetermined the outcome.179
Also worth emphasizing here is the relationship between emotions in
general and the affect heuristic in particular.180 As earlier discussed, the
affect heuristic is a System One mechanism that uses emotions as a source of
information about the target of judgment (e.g., whether the target is
responsible for harm). But more generally, emotions can also affect how we
process information (e.g., fast or slow). If so, then all of the heuristics and
biases—not only the affect heuristic—may be triggered by emotions.
Fourth, emotions can mediate a person’s decisions of whether, whom, or
what to blame. People who feel angry are more inclined to perceive harm
171. See Quigley & Tedeschi, supra note 169, at 1281–82 (modeling the potential for
feedback loops between anger and blame).
172. Id.
173. See Dacher Keltner et al., Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger
on Social Perception, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 740, 741 (1993).
174. See id.
175. See Jennifer Lerner et al., Sober Second Thought: The Effects of Accountability,
Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 563 (1998); Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Linton, Judgment Under
Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emotions on Information
Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973, 985 (2001).
176. Tiedens & Linton, supra note 175, at 974.
177. Id.
178. See Haidt, supra note 121, at 814. For a critique of this view, see generally David A.
Pizzaro & Paul Bloom, The Intelligence of the Moral Intuitions: Comment on Haidt (2001),
110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (2003). And, for a response, see generally Jonathan Haidt, The
Emotional Dog Does Learn New Tricks: A Reply to Pizarro and Bloom (2003), 110 PSYCHOL.
REV. 197 (2003).
179. See Haidt, supra note 121, at 814.
180. See supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text (discussing the affect heuristic).
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because the emotion’s negative valence makes their surroundings appear
more negative.181 Further, when harm is detected, anger can skew
perceptions of causal responsibility toward individuals rather than toward
situations.182 Thus, for example, an angry person may blame undocumented
migrants for crossing the U.S. border or blame the president for taking
unilateral action (i.e., blame individuals). Meanwhile, a person who feels sad
or sympathetic might blame our unjustified immigration system or political
dysfunction (i.e., blame situations).183
Relatedly, emotions can affect assessments of risk and probability.184 For
present purposes, risk perceptions are important insofar as immigration is (or
is made to be) a type of risk regulation. What is the risk that migrants will
steal American jobs? What is the risk that migrants are or will become
terrorists, gang members, or criminals? What is the risk that granting
amnesty will lead to new waves of undocumented migration? What is the
risk that an asylum seeker will be turned away and tortured or killed upon
repatriation? What is the risk of political backlash against a legislator who
casts a vote in favor of funding a border wall?
In Part II.A, this Article discussed how non-emotional heuristics and
biases might influence judgments and choices about risk in the face of
uncertainty. Likewise, emotions such as anger, fear, and anxiety will
influence how the polity and public officials answer risk-related questions.
In general, fearful people are prone to think that bad things will happen to
them; as a consequence, they are prone to make pessimistic risk
assessments.185 By contrast, angry people are less likely to think that bad
things will happen, in part because angry people have an inflated sense of
certainty and control over their environment.186 As a consequence, people
experiencing anger tend to make optimistic risk assessments. Thus, whether
from anger, fear, or both, estimates of the likelihood and seriousness of
various risks often diverge from the objective probability and severity of
those risks.187
181. See Gordon H. Bower & Joseph P. Forgas, Mood and Social Memory, in HANDBOOK
95, 115 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2001) (explaining that
experiencing an emotion makes features of that emotion’s cognitive or appraisal structure
more accessible and thus more likely to be utilized in subsequent perceptions and judgments).
182. See Keltner et al., supra note 173, at 741–42, 751–52 (finding that angry participants
tended to attribute more responsibility to the person than to the situation regarding ambiguous
social mishaps); Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 156 (2001) (finding that people feeling sad tended to
attribute causation to situational factors; whereas angry people tended to attribute causation to
individuals).
183. Cf. Keltner et al., supra note 173, at 741–42, 751–52.
184. Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization, and the Perception of Risk,
45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 29 (1983).
185. Id.
186. Lerner & Keltner, supra note 182, at 154–55; see also Feigenson, supra note 134, at
980–81 (extending these insights to 9/11 litigation).
187. Paul Slovic et al., Behavioral Decision Theory Perspectives on Protective Behavior,
in TAKING CARE: UNDERSTANDING AND ENCOURAGING SELF-PROTECTIVE BEHAVIOR 14, 28–
34 (Neil D. Weinstein ed., 1987); Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding
OF THE AFFECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION
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Finally, as we all know from experience, emotions can influence not only
how we think, but also how we behave.188 For example, when we feel angry,
happy, fearful, or sympathetic, we may act in ways that we otherwise might
not if we felt differently. Moreover, the intensity of our emotions can
mediate our motivations to act.189 If we are feeling only a little angry, a little
happy, a little afraid, or a little sympathetic, we might not act on those
emotions. Yet we might be more inclined to do so if we are outraged,
ecstatic, terrified, or highly sympathetic. Thus, emotions can have significant
implications for whether and how people vote, whether and how people
publicly protest or support government policies, and so on. Likewise, the
type and intensity of emotions can bear on the actions of public officials,
directly or indirectly.190
C. Cultural Influences
A dominant strand of cultural theory posits that people hold “worldviews,”
which are latent preferences about how society should be organized.191
Pertinent here, cultural theory suggests that a person’s worldview will
influence his or her judgments of blame.192 More specifically, an event or
policy may register (or not) as an avoidable harm depending on the
perceiver’s worldview; likewise, causal attributions of responsibility may
hinge on the perceiver’s worldview.
For example, under a “hierarchist” worldview, blame should attach to
those who do not follow the rules or respect authority.193 Under an
“egalitarian” worldview, blame should attach to those who flout popular
Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 122,
at 463–78.
188. This is one of the key insights of the behavioral-economics and law-and-emotions
literatures. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 25, at 2003–21 (comparing and situating the
behavioral-economics and law-and-emotions literatures, with citations to leading work in the
respective fields).
189. See Joep Sonnemans & Nico H. Frijda, The Structure of Subjective Emotional
Intensity, 8 COGNITION & EMOTION 329, 342 (1994).
190. For an extended treatment of these tendencies, see generally DREW WESTEN, THE
POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING THE FATE OF THE NATION (2007).
191. See MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ESSAY ON THE
SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 2–4 (1982); THOMPSON ET AL.,
supra note 26, at 1–2. In cultural theory, worldviews are generally classified along two
dimensions: “group” (which “refers to the extent to which an individual is incorporated into
bounded units”) and “grid” (which “denotes the degree to which an individual’s life is
circumscribed by externally imposed prescriptions”). THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 26, at 5–
8 (elaborating on this model); see also Mary Douglas, Being Fair to Hierarchists, 151 U. PA.
L. REV. 1349, 1352–57 (2003) (same).
192. DOUGLAS, supra note 26, at 6 (employing cultural theory to explain the human need
to transfer blame for disaster onto unpopular groups or classes); SHAVER, supra note 13, at 2
(explaining that “judgments of causality, responsibility, and culpability made in a particular
case are affected by more widely held cultural values”); Kahan, supra note 26, at 738 (“Each
culture must have its notions of dirt and defilement which are contrasted with its notion of the
positive structure which must not be negated.”).
193. See Christopher Hood, Accountability and Blame-Avoidance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 603, 613 (Marc Bovens et al. eds., 2014) (discussing
blame through the lens of cultural theory).
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opinion or who act without group support.194 Under an “individualist”
worldview, blame should attach to those who are considered personally inept
or maladroit, which raises the prospect of blaming the victim.195
Related research in “cultural cognition” adds psychological insights.196
According to this nascent branch of cultural theory, “culture is prior to
facts.”197 Thus, people’s worldviews will anchor their perceptions of risk
and harm, operate as a screen through which heuristics and biases work, and
mediate emotional responses.198
Recall that under the availability heuristic, people make judgments about
the propensity of an event based on how easily (or not) similar events come
to mind.199 But which events will leave an impression and be remembered
when the availability heuristic is triggered? Cultural-cognition theory offers
an answer: a person’s worldview will influence the saliency and recall of
events in a person’s mind.200 People tend to take note of and assign
significance to instances of harm associated with behavior they despise—a
tendency reinforced by negativity bias.201
Relatedly, cultural-cognition theory provides a gloss on confirmation bias.
Recall that under that bias, people tend to seek out and believe information
that coheres with their preexisting beliefs.202 But what is the source and
nature of those preexisting beliefs? Here again, cultural worldviews are part
of the answer—at least in hot-button contexts, such as immigration, where a
person’s worldview is likely to feel threatened by competing worldviews.203
A person’s cultural worldview may also influence their emotional reaction
to information and events.204 If an immigration-related activity or policy
prompts fear, anger, sympathy, or another emotion, chances are that the
emotions elicited, and whom they are directed at, will reflect and reinforce a
person’s preferences about how society should be structured.205
Through these and other psychological mechanisms, groups of likeminded individuals polarize, not only around subjective societal values, but
also around ostensibly objective facts.206 As Dan Kahan explains, the fit
194. See id. at 613–14.
195. See id. at 613.
196. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 739.
197. Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1083–84 (2006) (book review).
198. Kahan, supra note 26, at 742, 747; see also infra notes 200–08 and accompanying text
(elaborating on these connections).
199. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
200. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 747.
201. See id. at 747–49, 752; see also supra notes 139–43 and accompanying text
(discussing negativity bias).
202. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
203. See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 156–57 (2006); Kahan, supra note 26, at 742, 747.
204. See Kahan, supra note 147, at 117; Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 744–52 (2008) [hereinafter Kahan, Two Conceptions
of Emotion].
205. See Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion, supra note 204, at 748–57.
206. See Kahan, supra note 26, at 749.
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between an expert’s position and the one congenial to a person’s cultural
predisposition is what causes that person “to take note of that expert’s view,
to assign significance to it, and thereafter recall it.”207 What is more, studies
in cultural cognition show that people tend to credit or discredit an expert’s
factual assessments depending on whether the expert shares the perceiver’s
worldview.208 Thus, cultural-cognition theory predicts that when lay people
are faced with conflicting empirical accounts of immigration crime,
undocumented employment, and so on, they will gravitate toward the
opinions of their trusted, culturally aligned experts.
D. Packaging and Presentation
In light of the foregoing, judgments and behaviors relating to blame can
be heavily influenced by how information is packaged and presented. More
specifically, the way information is packaged and presented will affect how
it is processed, both at the individual and group levels.209 The discussion
here focuses on three styles of messaging that saturate immigration blame:
narratives, metaphors, and framing.
Narratives generally convey information through qualitative anecdotes.210
Whether factual or fictional, narratives are indispensable to how people
perceive and understand the world around them.211 Moreover, narratives hit
cognitive chords that pie charts and number-crunching studies miss.212 For
example, the backstories about a family torn apart by deportation,213 or the
gory details of a migrant’s violent crime,214 invoke different and deeper
207. Id.
208. See id. at. 749–50; see also Kahan et al., supra note 197, at 1084–85, 1093–94.
209. See generally, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (providing a behavioraleconomics account); Kahan, supra note 147 (providing a cultural-cognition account).
210. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 1020–41
(1991) (arguing that narratives are valuable sources of knowledge through the illuminating
quality of their affective charge, and also through the distinctive insights and perspectives their
stories convey); Derrick Bell, The Power of Narrative, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 315, 315–17 (1999).
211. On the role of narratives in shaping law and politics, see generally ANTHONY G.
AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000) and WESTEN, supra note 190.
212. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 830 (1993) (“Vivid examples often influence us more
than statistical evidence.”); Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between
Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2227–28 (1989) (arguing that
narrative fits the mind’s way of making sense of its experiences).
213. For recent, heart-wrenching accounts, see Jonathan Blitzer, Donald Trump’s ICE Is
Tearing Families Apart, NEW YORKER (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/donald-trump-ice-tearing-families-apart [https://perma.cc/P57L-VLCU]. See also
Michael Alison Chandler, Deportations of Parents Can Cast the Lives of U.S.-Citizen Kids
into Turmoil, WASH. POST (Dec. 29, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/
deportations-of-parents-can-cast-the-lives-of-us-citizen-kids-into-turmoil/2013/12/29/
abdf23aa-6b4c-11e3-b405-7e360f7e9fd2_story.html [https://perma.cc/2HTX-HKS6]; Debbi
Nathan, Hidden Horrors of “Zero Tolerance”—Mass Trials and Children Taken from Their
Parents, INTERCEPT (May 29, 2018, 12:26 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/05/29/zerotolerance-border-policy-immigration-mass-trials-children/ [https://perma.cc/2HZ5-LWKE].
214. Cf. Lukas Mikelionis, Illegal Immigrant Found Guilty in Murder of Family of Five in
San Francisco, FOX NEWS (Dec. 12, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/12/12/illegal-
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emotional reactions than phlegmatic statistics about deportation and crime
rates.
Metaphors are another way that information can be conveyed and
translated into blame.215 A metaphor is “a figure of speech in which a word
or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of
another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them.”216 Research in
cognitive linguistics demonstrates that people view the world in metaphoric
terms.217 For purposes of blame attribution, metaphors can thus affect our
perceptions of harm and responsibility.218 Take, for instance, the “flood of
immigrants” metaphor.219 This metaphor conveys an uncontrollable, and
perhaps destructive, influx of noncitizens.220 Statistical reports on the
numbers and effects of migrants in the country would come closer to some
objective truth. The flood metaphor, however, is catchier, more likely to
drive perceptions about harm, and thus more likely to factor into attributions
of blame. For an institutional example, consider “congressional gridlock.”
This metaphor conveys more than legislative stasis—it conveys a feeling or
sense of frustration.221 Of course, the causes of legislative stasis and traffic
jams are quite different. But the metaphor connects the two in ways that can
alter how we understand congressional inaction.
The manner in which information is framed can also affect how that
information is processed and folded into blame-related judgments. Through
framing adjustments, the very same thing or event may be cast in two (or
more) different lights.222 For example, does high-volume migration yield
“cultural diversity,” as integrationists contend, or “cultural contamination,”
as some restrictionists contend? Are migrants “our neighbors” or “invading
immigrant-found-guilty-in-murder-family-five-in-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/PV7Z
-9UPB].
215. McLeod, supra note 63, at 164 n.352 (“[H]ow we think metaphorically affects how
we talk about problems and the solutions we formulate in response to those problems.”).
216. Metaphor, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003); see also
ZOLTÁN KÖVECSES, METAPHOR: A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION viii (2002) (summarizing the
“cognitive linguistic view of metaphor”).
217. Hugh G. Petrie & Rebecca S. Oshlag, Metaphor and Learning, in METAPHOR AND
THOUGHT 579, 589 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993) (“[M]etaphor is what enables one to
pass from the more familiar to the unfamiliar . . . .”). For extended discussions of how
metaphors are used (and abused) in the immigration context, see, for example, JOHNSON, supra
note 7, at 153–57 and Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 64, at 1547. For path-breaking work
on the significance of metaphors for the law more generally, see Steven L. Winter,
Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1105, 1130–36, 1142–56 (1988).
218. Cf. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 64, at 1549 (“[D]angers of distortion and
conflation—risks associated with all metaphors—are heightened in the immigration
context.”); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1382 (1988) (warning against the uncritical use of metaphors).
219. See OTTO SANTA ANA, BROWN TIDE RISING: METAPHORS OF LATINOS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 65–81 (2002) (analyzing the use of water
metaphors in immigration debates).
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Stolberg & Fandos, supra note 65.
222. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 705 (discussing “the framing effect, whereby
given data are evaluated differently depending on how they are framed”).
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strangers”?223 Are unaccompanied minors seeking refuge at our border
victims of gang-related violence in their home countries, or future gang
members in ours?224
Other types of framing adjustments zoom in or out, to capture a different
mix of considerations that may bear on attributions of blame. For instance,
the Obama administration’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) program may strike observers as more or less blameworthy,
depending on whether it is viewed in isolation or conjunction with his
administration’s subsequent Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
(DAPA) program.225 Likewise, President Trump’s third travel ban may
strike observers as more or less blameworthy depending on whether it is
viewed in conjunction with his prior travel bans, his campaign rhetoric
calling for a “Muslim ban,” and so on.226 In short, context matters when
assigning blame. And the context that matters depends on how information
is framed.
More generally, framing effects can also influence how information is
mentally processed—that is, through System One (fast and reflexive) and
System Two (slow and reflective). For instance, according to prospect
223. KENT A. ONO & JOHN M. SLOOP, SHIFTING BORDERS: RHETORIC, IMMIGRATION, AND
CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 187, at 40 (2002) (discussing popular media images of a
“generalized brown figure encroaching from [the] south”); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note
64, at 1571–72 (“[A]lien metaphors present immigrants not only as invaders from foreign
countries, but also as nonhuman aggressors from foreign worlds.”); Editorial, Street-Corner
Immigration Reform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/25/
opinion/streetcorner-immigration-reform.html [https://perma.cc/K2U5-G2Z2] (rejecting the
view of “illegal immigrants” as an “invading army” and depicting them instead as “determined
immigrants” who “trim our hedges, prepare our food and care for our children”).
224. Seung Min Kim, Trump Warns Against Admitting Unaccompanied Migrant Children:
‘They’re Not Innocent,’ WASH. POST (May 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/trump-warns-against-admitting-unaccompanied-migrant-children-theyre-notinnocent/2018/05/23/e4b24a68-5ec2-11e8-8c93-8cf33c21da8d_story.html [https://perma.cc/
6NEN-JL7H].
225. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BY5B-E6MP] [hereinafter DAPA Memo]; Memorandum from Janet
Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S.
Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XZ8R-FLVK] [hereinafter DACA Memo]. Under DACA, individuals who
arrived in the United States under the age of sixteen and who met other requirements could
apply for deferred action and work authorization for renewable periods. See DACA Memo,
supra. DAPA has a similar structure, except that it extended to parents of U.S. citizens and
parents of lawful permanent residents. See DAPA Memo, supra. For further discussion of
DACA and DAPA, see infra Part IV.C.2.
226. Compare Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017), with Levy,
supra note 40. Indeed, in Trump v. Hawaii, the Court had to grapple with this issue of
contextual framing. See slip op. at 23 (“At the heart of plaintiffs’ case is a series of statements
by the President and his advisers casting doubt on the official objective of the Proclamation.”);
id. at 35 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[The Proclamation] masquerades behind a facade of
national-security concerns. But this repackaging does little to cleanse [it] of the appearance
of discrimination that the President’s words have created.”).
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theory, information that is framed as a “loss” will register in System One
more intensely than if the same information is presented as a “gain.”227
E. “Blame Cascades”
At the group level—where psychology and sociology meet—heuristics,
biases, emotions, and cultural cognition can have snowballing effects on
society or subcommunities within it.228
Most significantly, availability cascades can seriously distort group
perceptions about risk and harm.229 An availability cascade “is a selfreinforcing process . . . by which an expressed perception triggers a chain
reaction that gives the perception increasing plausibility through its rising
availability in public discourse.”230 Thus, for example, the more that people
hear narratives of hardworking or criminal migrants, the more easily these
narratives come to mind. And the more easily they come to mind, the more
readily they may be repeated, retweeted, and recycled in social discourse.
Extending these insights, this Article introduces the idea of blame
cascades. A blame cascade occurs when avalanching perceptions of
avoidable harm and responsibility lead to widespread blame.231 Publicity
given to blaming of certain targets for certain harms adds social proof, and
reinforces, whom or what to blame. In extreme form, large segments of
society may blame migrants or public officials without independently
assessing whether blame is warranted. For instance, when enough people
blame migrants for such and so, or the president for this and that, more people
may jump on those group bandwagons, even though they might not have
blamed in their individual capacity.232
Blame cascades can occur organically and spontaneously. But they can
also be strategically manufactured by politicians, advocates, and social elites,
who employ narratives, metaphors, and framing devices to shape and
maintain public perceptions.233 In a blame cascade, the objectively weaker
227. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 279–80 (1979).
228. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 757–59 (positing the existence of availability
cascades, where “media coverage of gripping, unrepresentative incidents” creates durable and
empirically invalid social beliefs about social phenomena); see also supra Part II.C (discussing
how cultural worldviews contribute to tribalism and polarization).
229. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 757–59.
230. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 683.
231. Cf. id. at 761–62 (explaining that, for reputational reasons, people often believe
something because others appear to believe it; or they feign conviction to avoid reputational
harm); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The Availability Heuristic and
Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 94–96 (2005) (describing a social
phenomenon whereby information and beliefs are passed along from person to person, each
of whom is too busy to apply his or her own analysis).
232. Cf. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 703 (“[P]eople tended to form their risk
judgments largely, if not entirely, on the basis of information produced through a social
process, rather than through personal experience or investigation.”).
233. Id. at 687–88 (characterizing the activity of policy entrepreneurs); Sunstein, supra
note 126, at 758–59 (“Many perceived ‘epidemics’ are in reality no such thing, but instead a
product of media coverage of gripping, unrepresentative incidents.”); see also FRANK FUREDI,
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side of a debate may triumph simply by exploiting audiences’ cognitive
shortcuts, stoking the right emotions, and reaching targeted audiences at the
right times.234
The twenty-four-hour news cycle exacerbates the potential for blame
cascades, both organic and manufactured. Sensationalism sells. Owing to
audiences’ negativity bias, negative sensationalism sells even better.235 And
with new technologies and social platforms, our exposure to information is
seldom more than a few clicks or swipes away.236
*

*

*

The foregoing discussion offered an account of how blame is attributed to
migrants and public officials in the immigration context; how legal structures
may inform or confound those judgments; and how heuristics, biases,
emotions, and cultural worldviews factor in. But blame attribution is only
part of the story. In life and politics, the impulse to lay blame is often met
with the impulse to avoid it.237 In conjunction with blame attribution, blame
avoidance is an essential feature of immigration blame. The discussion
below elaborates.
III. BLAME AVOIDANCE
The term “blame avoidance” is used here to describe a range of actions
that individuals and groups employ to escape, minimize, or diffuse blame.238
This Part provides a typology of blame-avoidance strategies, drawn from
studies in political science and sociology.239 Generally speaking, there are
three ways to avoid blame. First, blame avoiders can try to refute or mitigate
perceptions of avoidable harm. Second, blame avoiders can try to shape or
reshape perceptions of responsibility for the harm at issue. In the absence of

POLITICS OF FEAR 123–41 (2005) (discussing the rise of “fear entrepreneurs” in modern
societies); Fan, supra note 126, at 45–46 (noting that people can erroneously rely on illusory
correlations manufactured by others).
234. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 124, at 713–14.
235. Cf. KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 301 (“The brains of humans and other animals
contain a mechanism that is designed to give priority to bad news.”); Sunstein, supra note 126,
at 758–59.
236. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED REPUBLIC IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
98–108 (2017) (describing how the online world creates “cybercascades” and political
fragmentation).
237. See D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini, The Contours of Blame, in BLAME: ITS
NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1, at 3, 9 (“Judgments [of blame] are tinged with normativity,
and because of this carry a certain force: they are the sorts of judgments that we would rather
not have made about us.”); Hood, supra note 3, at 167–71 (discussing the impulse and
incentives for public officials to avoid blame).
238. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 4–6; Weaver, supra note 13, at 375.
239. For some of the key works, see generally RICHARD J. ELLIS, PRESIDENTIAL LIGHTNING
RODS: THE POLITICS OF BLAME AVOIDANCE (1994); HOOD, supra note 10; BARRY R.
SCHLENKER, IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT: THE SELF-CONCEPT, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1980); and Weaver, supra note 13.
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perceived harm or responsibility, blame generally will not attach.240 Third,
an otherwise blameworthy act or omission might be excused or justified.241
In turn, these generic blame-avoiding methods can be pursued in a variety
of ways. As captured by political scientist Christopher Hood, blameavoidance tactics generally fall into one or more of the following categories:
(1) presentational strategies; (2) agency strategies; and (3) policy
strategies.242 For migrants and public officials alike, blame avoidance can
be more or less convincing, more or less obvious, and more or less valuable
to public discourse and outcomes.243
A. Presentational Strategies
Blame avoiders select which information to offer, when to offer it, and
how to present it.244 These presentational tactics are generally available to
all the relevant players in immigration blame (migrants, public officials, and
their respective advocates and spokespersons). Instructively, the same
cognitive, social, and political dynamics that feed blame attribution also
support presentational blame avoidance.245 Thus, for instance, politicians
and immigrant advocates employ narratives, metaphors, and framing
techniques to avoid blame. Moreover, these blame-avoiding tactics get
amplified, spread, and filtered through policy entrepreneurs and mass-media
outlets.
In addition, excuses and justifications are common to presentational blame
avoidance. Whereas excuses generally try to negate perceptions of harm and
responsibility, justifications are positive attempts to turn blame into credit.246
When attributions of blame turn on the blamee’s motivations (e.g.,
intentionality), excuses and justifications can negate or mitigate
culpability.247 For instance, it is one thing if a public official intended to
discriminate against migrants on racial grounds, but another thing if official
action unintentionally had a disparate impact on migrants of color.
Depending on perspective, and context, the lack of intentionality may
mitigate institutional blame. More generally, excuses and justifications play
240. Or, so I argue. See infra notes 448–52 and accompanying text (calling for an ethic of
blaming only blameworthy action).
241. See SHAVER, supra note 13, at vii (“[Blame] is the outcome of a process that begins
with an event having negative consequences, involves judgments about causality, personal
responsibility, and possible mitigation.”); infra Part III.A and accompanying text (discussing
excuses and justifications).
242. See generally HOOD, supra note 10 (offering a detailed study of these blame-avoidance
strategies in public governance).
243. See infra Part V (discussing the values and pathologies of immigration blame).
244. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 17 (offering a generalized account of presentational
tactics in public administration).
245. See supra Part II (discussing the psychological and social processes of attributing and
misattributing blame).
246. See J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address, 57 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 2 (1956) (distinguishing excuses from justifications).
247. All else equal, we are more likely to blame a person who deliberately caused harm
than we are to blame a person without such intentions. See Alicke, supra note 121, at 559–61;
Solan, supra note 1, at 1019.
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important roles in our social and legal ordering. They direct attention to what
should (and should not) matter in any given context where blaming
judgments loom.248
1. Migrant Blame Avoidance
For purely humanistic reasons, migrants have incentives to avoid being
blamed—especially when the blame is misattributed or invidiously
concocted. Another reason to avoid blame, however, is more pragmatic: the
prospects of a migrant’s legal and social membership may depend on public
perceptions about the migrant’s relative blameworthiness.249
At the individual level, perceptions of blame can make the difference of
whether a migrant is targeted for deportation or eligible for discretionary
relief.250 At the group level, which is my focus, relative degrees of blame
can inform how immigration laws are shaped and implemented.251
Today’s amnesty debates provide useful illustrations of presentational
tactics for avoiding migrant blame at the macrolevel. Broadly defined,
amnesty denotes a process through which unauthorized migrants may
transition to legal status.252 The very idea of immigration amnesty
presupposes an underlying legal violation (most commonly, for unlawful
entry or overstaying a visa).253
All mainstream arguments for amnesty offer excuses. The most common
take a “yes-but” form. For example: yes the law was broken, but
undocumented presence is a minor offense.254 Other yes-but excuses provide
morally grounded, emotion-provoking explanations for the immigration
infraction: yes the law was broken, but by individuals who were simply
trying to provide a better life for their families or to escape social strife in
their home countries.255 Another variation works on the time dimension: yes
the law was broken, but the passage of time and the migrant’s resulting ties
248. Erin I. Kelly, What Is an Excuse?, in BLAME: ITS NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1,
at 244, 244–45, 256 (“In evaluating an agent’s blameworthiness, we assess how reasonable it
is to expect an agent to act morally in the face of obstacles. . . . [M]orality itself requires that
we relax our expectations that [the agent] should have [acted differently].”).
249. See infra Part IV (further developing these claims).
250. Some deportable migrants may be entitled to statutory and equitable forms of relief.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (cancellation of removal). However, the availability of
those discretionary outlets is also heavily informed by perceptions of blame. See id.
§ 1229b(b) (permitting certain deportable noncitizens to avoid removal and adjust to legal
status if certain conditions are met, including “good moral character” and a favorable grant of
discretion). For an excellent account of how narratives of “good” and “bad” migrants can
affect immigration outcomes in immigration court, see generally Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond
Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New Narratives in the U.S. Immigration
System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207 (2012).
251. See Keyes, supra note 250, at 226–27.
252. Linda Bosniak, Amnesty in Immigration: Forgetting, Forgiving, Freedom, in THE
MARGINS OF CITIZENSHIP 26, 26 (Philip Cook & Jonathan Seglow eds., 2014).
253. Id. at 28, 34.
254. Id.
255. MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 172–207 (providing a morally based account for a
broadscale legalization program).
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to the community create a moral claim to stay.256 Under this time-and-ties
framing, “the immigrant was once, but is no longer, blameworthy.”257
Other excuses are relativistic. Explicitly or implicitly, distinctions are
drawn in amnesty proposals between children and adults,258 criminals and
noncriminals,259 violent criminals and nonviolent criminals,260 longtime
residents and new arrivals,261 and present versus future migrants.262 In each
of these examples, one subcategory of migrants is arguably more excusable,
and thus less blameworthy, than another subcategory of migrants. Although
often unintended, these juxtapositions can result in a type of scapegoating
among scapegoats, whereby migrant blame is scaled from most to least
deserving.263 Other forms of relativistic excuses are redirectional in a
different sense: they shift attention from one harm (the migrant’s legal

256. Political philosopher Joseph Carens has argued that “[p]eople who live and work and
raise their families in a society become members, whatever their legal status.” JOSEPH H.
CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO STAY 18 (2010). In effect, Carens proposes, “the
passage of time creates a moral claim to stay.” Id. at 23. For Ayelet Shachar, rootedness
constitutes a basis for membership. Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons
for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 110, 121 (2011). “[T]he longer the person
resides in the polity, the deeper his or her ties to its society, the stronger the claim for inclusion
and membership.” Id. at 131. According to Hiroshi Motomura, affiliations justify regularized
status. MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 176.
257. Bosniak, supra note 252, at 39–40 (noting and critiquing this view on the ground that
it unnecessarily concedes that the migrants were ever blameworthy for their unlawful
presence).
258. For almost two decades, legislative proposals for the DREAM Act have been
presented in Congress but for various reasons have failed to clear the legislative gauntlet. See
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001); see
also The Dream Act, DACA, and Other Policies Designed to Protect Dreamers, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/dream-actdaca-and-other-policies-designed-protect-dreamers
[https://perma.cc/4XP4-GG4F].
Sometimes, these proposals have been offered in combination with comprehensive
immigration reform. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348,
110th Cong. (2007). But DREAM Act proposals have also been offered in isolation, to set it
apart from more inclusive amnesty programs. See, e.g., Dream Act of 2017, S. 1615, 115th
Cong. (2017); DREAM Act of 2011, S. 952, 112th Cong. (2011).
259. Cházaro, supra note 61, at 374 (arguing that the “[w]e are not criminals, we are
workers” pro-amnesty slogan makes migrants who commit crime more vulnerable to harsh
immigration treatment).
260. See, e.g., S. 1615 § 3(b)(1)(C)(iii) (disqualifying potential beneficiaries who have
been convicted of certain types or numbers of offenses).
261. See, e.g., id. § 3(b)(1)(A) (limiting protected status to those who have “been
continuously physically present in the United States since the date that is 4 years before the
date of the enactment of this Act”).
262. See Cházaro, supra note 61, at 360–61 (“If a [comprehensive immigration reform] bill
passed today, those currently unlikely to benefit from a legalization strategy . . . would face
even greater vulnerability . . . .”).
263. “In modern times, the term scapegoat has been used to describe a relatively powerless
innocent who is made to take the blame for something that is not his fault.” DOUGLAS, supra
note 37, at 109; see also Elliot Aronson, Persuasion Via Self-Justification: Large
Commitments for Small Rewards, in RETROSPECTIONS ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 3 (Leon
Festinger ed., 1980); Cházaro, supra note 61, at 413 (“In pushing forward narratives about
immigrants’ hard-working, law-abiding nature, the politics of respectability hide or ignore the
most vulnerable immigrants.”).
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transgression) to weightier harms (e.g., a de facto caste system, opportunity
costs to the country, and so on).
Moreover, “no-harm-no-foul” excuses are mainstays in the pro-amnesty
toolbox. Through statistical proof or otherwise, amnesty advocates work to
negate or mitigate allegations that undocumented migrants depress wages,
increase net crime, threaten national security, and so on.264
Beyond excuses, some amnesty advocates offer justifications, which try to
turn blame into credit.265 To the extent that America’s immigration laws are
de facto discriminatory, or otherwise immoral, the justificatory claim is that
amnesty can vindicate American values.266 More generally, amnesty
advocates try to depict undocumented migrants in a favorable light. These
positive accounts are supported and amplified by narratives about
hardworking, family-centric, law-abiding undocumented migrants.267 To
complement these narratives, metaphors about families “torn apart,” or
“living in the shadows” of a “broken” immigration system, are offered as
reasons for a “pathway” to citizenship.268
Employing these and other presentational tactics, amnesty advocates try to
replace or complicate the space otherwise occupied by retributive attitudes
associated with anger and fear.269 System One cognitions are more likely to
be mediated and checked by System Two if a person is made to feel
emotionally conflicted.270 Thus, presentational tactics that conjure emotions

264. See, e.g., From Anecdotes to Evidence: Setting the Record Straight on Immigrants
and Crime, supra note 128.
265. See Bosniak, supra note 252, at 41–43.
266. See generally JOSEPH H. CARENS, ALIENS AND CITIZENS: THE CASE FOR OPEN
BORDERS (1987); MOTOMURA, supra note 51; Bosniak, supra note 252 (championing this
view). In a variation of this theme, Daniel Morales argues that undocumented migration is a
form of speech, which valuably forces Americans to confront questions about the legitimacy
of and need for border controls. See Daniel I. Morales, “Illegal” Migration Is Speech, 92 IND.
L.J. 735, 735 (2017). Worth emphasizing here is that arguments for open borders moot the
sort of stratification and subcategorization between more and less deserving amnesty
beneficiaries. See supra notes 258–63 and accompanying text. But most amnesty advocates
do not support open borders, either for ideological or pragmatic reasons. See, e.g., Joseph H.
Carens, Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration, 30 INT’L MIGRATION
REV. 156, 158 (1996) (withdrawing from an open-borders position to a more “realistic”
approach that recognizes sovereign authority “to admit or exclude aliens as it chooses”).
267. See Cházaro, supra note 61, at 357–58.
268. Victoria Balara, Fox News Poll: 83 Percent Support Pathway to Citizenship for
Illegal Immigrants, FOX NEWS (Sept. 28, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/09/28
/fox-news-poll-83-percent-support-pathway-to-citizenship-for-illegal-immigrants.html
[https://perma.cc/Q5KX-8DS8]; Laurie Fischer, Allow Peaceful, Law-Abiding Working
Immigrants Out of the Shadows, HILL (Apr. 25, 2017, 9:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs
/congress-blog/labor/330287-allow-peaceful-law-abiding-working-immigrants-out-of-theshadows [https://perma.cc/RFE6-92Y4]; Ricky Walters, My Experience with the Broken
Immigration System, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
ricky-walters/my-experience-with-the-br_b_10616646.html [https://perma.cc/FES5-ZGTF].
269. See supra Part II.B (discussing the role of emotions in judgment formation).
270. See Haidt, supra note 178, at 197–98.
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such as sadness, sympathy, or mercy, may help to counteract anti-amnesty
rhetoric.271
2. Institutional Blame Avoidance
Like migrants, public officials utilize a range of presentational tactics to
avoid institutional blame. For instance, a public official that is blamed for an
immigration policy may argue that it was justified because, even if costly in
the short term, the benefits of the policy will more than pay off in the long
term.272 In this example, the justification seeks to garner credit for the very
thing the public official is being blamed for.
Alternatively, or additionally, the same public official might offer an
excuse, like “my hands were tied” or “I voted against the policy.”273 Notice
that these sorts of excuses acknowledge harm, but deny responsibility ex
post, when institutional blame comes home to roost. For a recent and
prominent example, consider President Trump’s attempt to deflect blame for
the separation of children from parents entering the country unlawfully.
Between May 5 and June 9, 2018, federal agents separated more than 2300
children from parents who were prosecuted for crimes relating to unlawful
entry.274 Facing widespread criticism for these family separations, President
Trump and his top administrative officials acknowledged that the underlying
“law” was “horrible” and harmful to children.275 What the Trump

271. Cf. Gregory R. Maio et al., Ambivalence and Persuasion: The Processing of Messages
About Immigrant Groups, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 531 (1996) (finding that
people who are ambivalent toward a group of migrants are more likely to engage in systematic
processing of strong messages about the migrant group).
272. This was President Obama’s approach: he took aggressive enforcement measures in
certain respects, and he hoped to justify them in the long run by gaining bipartisan support for
comprehensive immigration reform. See David A. Martin, Resolute Enforcement Is Not Just
for Restrictionists: Building a Stable and Efficient Immigration Enforcement System, 30 J.L.
& POL. 411, 420–24 (2015) (describing this political calculus, and offering a partial defense
and critique).
273. See, e.g., Scott Detrow, Why Reaching a DACA Deal Could Be Tough, NPR (Jan. 11,
2018, 4:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/11/577453475/why-reaching-a-daca-dealcould-be-tough [https://perma.cc/AQ6S-LSN7]. Speaking about a DACA legalization effort,
Senator Dick Durbin said, “I am doing my best to get everything I can under the current
political circumstances. It’s not what I want. It’s what I’m forced to accept because of the
realities.” Id.
274. See Philip Rucker et al., Trump Defiant as Crisis Grows over Family Separation at
the Border, WASH. POST (June 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumpdefiant-as-crisis-grows-over-family-separation-at-the-border/2018/06/18/210c78ca-730f11e8-805c-4b67019fcfe4_story.html [https://perma.cc/T2WZ-533V].
275. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2018, 6:59 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1000375761604370434 [https://perma.cc/2JWNZ7C8] (“Put pressure on the Democrats to end the horrible law that separates children from
there [sic] parents once they cross the Border into the U.S.”); see also Seung Min Kim & Mike
DeBonis, White House Says Trump Backs GOP Immigration Bills, Despite Comments
Opposing Them. One Official Says Trump Misunderstood Fox News’ Question., WASH. POST
(June 15, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-i-certainly-wouldnt-signhouse-gop-immigration-compromise/2018/06/15/731ffedc-70a0-11e8-9ab5-d31a80fd1a05
_story.html [https://perma.cc/JJ9Y-NVTN].
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administration denied, however, was responsibility for these harms.276 I will
return to this blame episode later;277 here, it is simply offered as an example
of ex post presentational blame avoidance.
In other cases, public officials try to renounce responsibility, ex ante, to
keep constituent expectations in check and institutional blame focused
elsewhere. A prominent example is the Obama administration’s early denials
of authority to unilaterally grant wide-scale relief to undocumented
migrants.278 As it turned out, this attempt at blame avoidance proved futile
and set in motion a series of subsequent presentational and policy tactics—
most notably DACA and DAPA.279 I will return to this episode, too, in later
parts of the discussion.280
B. Agency Strategies
Public officials may also avoid blame through agency strategies, which
generally involve attempts to deflect or limit blame by (re)allocating
responsibility.281 Unlike rhetorical finger-pointing (which is a presentational
tactic), agency strategies to avoid blame actually alter responsibility through
legal structures and other arrangements.
For instance, and perhaps most significantly, officials may delegate
decision-making authority with the intent or effect of avoiding institutional
blame.282 With respect to immigration, Congress delegates enforcement and
policymaking authority to various executive officials—ranging from the
president to various agency heads (e.g., Secretary of State, Attorney General,
Secretary of Homeland Security), sometimes with overlapping or
intersecting responsibilities.283 In turn, high-level federal officials can

276. See Tal Kopan, ‘We Will Not Apologize’: Trump DHS Chief Defends Immigration
Policy, CNN (June 18, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/kirstjen-nielsenimmigration-policy/index.html [https://perma.cc/M3QQ-NQ5U].
277. See infra notes 357–87 and accompanying text.
278. For instance, in 2011, the Obama administration’s Secretary of Homeland Security
testified in Congress that the agency had no plans to confer deferred action to large groups of
people. Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 32 (2011) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland
Security). Obama personally renounced executive authority to unilaterally grant legal reprieve
to undocumented migrants who were brought to the United States as children by their parents.
See Michael A. Olivas, Dreams Deferred: Deferred Action, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
Vexing Case(s) of DREAM Act Students, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 463, 472–73 (2012)
(describing the administration’s earlier position on its lack of authority to grant DREAM Acttype relief absent congressional action).
279. See DACA Memo, supra note 225; DAPA Memo, supra note 225.
280. See infra Part IV.C.2.
281. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 6–7, 67.
282. The notion that public officials delegate responsibility to avoid political flack has a
lineage in political science. See ELLIS, supra note 239, at 1; Morris P. Fiorina, Legislator
Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 33, 49 (1986).
283. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012) (assigning different responsibilities to the Attorney
General and the Secretary of Homeland Security); 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (2012) (assigning powers
and duties to the Secretary of State); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012) (authorizing the president to
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delegate downward to midlevel officials, who in turn may delegate to
frontline officials.284 When successful, these conferrals of authority shift or
diffuse responsibility away from the delegating authority and toward other
individuals or institutions that can serve as “lightning rods” if and when
things go wrong.285
Apart from delegating downward, public officials can avoid blame through
intergovernmental partnerships and arrangements.286 An immigration
example may be “Section 287(g) agreements,” whereby the federal
government cross deputizes subfederal officers to enforce federal
immigration law.287 Separately, under the Secure Communities program
(“SComm”), fingerprints of every person arrested and booked by state and
local police are automatically entered into a federal database.288 Via this
intergovernmental arrangement, federal immigration officials are
automatically alerted when an arrestee is a noncitizen.289
Alternatively, or additionally, government officials may enter into publicprivate partnerships through contracting or regulatory controls. Examples of
the former include public-private contracts for immigration detention

“suspend the entry” of noncitizens into the United States); see also Cuéllar, supra note 108,
at 45–50.
284. As just one of many examples, the powers and responsibilities of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR), which adjudicates immigration cases, derives its delegated
authority from the Attorney General. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a)–(b) (2018).
285. See Hood, supra note 3, at 200; see also ELLIS, supra note 239, at 4, 15–22 (describing
this phenomenon in the context of presidential delegations).
286. See Hood, supra note 3, at 200.
287. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012); see also Michele Waslin, ICE’s Enforcement
Priorities and the Factors That Undermine Them, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Nov. 9, 2010),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/ices-enforcement-priorities-andfactors-undermine-them [https://perma.cc/8AXX-LDHC]. Between 2006 and 2015, over
402,000 immigrants were identified for deportation through these partnership arrangements.
Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin McAleenan
et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_
Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immigration-Enforcement-ImprovementPolicies.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4DW-ZCBV].
288. In 2014, under pressure from immigrant advocates and subfederal officials, the Obama
administration replaced SComm with the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). Memorandum
from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski,
Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, et al. 1 (Nov. 20, 2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_
communities.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT7D-HEXS] (“The Secure Communities program, as we
know it, will be discontinued.”); see also Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons
from the Life and Times of Secure Communities, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1282–84 (2015)
(discussing the similarities and differences between PEP and SComm). Upon taking office,
President Trump rescinded PEP and reverted to the SComm program. See Enhancing Public
Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,768 § 10(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 8799
(Jan. 25, 2017).
289. See Stumpf, supra note 288, at 1260, 1267–68 (explaining the SComm program).
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facilities.290 Examples of the latter include laws that place legal
responsibilities on employers to enforce immigration labor restrictions.291
Proving that any particular delegation or partnering arrangement is
motivated by blame avoidance is beyond what I can hope to accomplish here.
Yet even if a delegation or partnering is not motivated to avoid blame ex ante,
the resulting arrangements offer ex post presentational outs. For instance, a
legislator who was not motivated to avoid blame when delegating a decision
may try to avoid blame through excuses or justifications for any downstream
harms.
C. Policy Strategies
A third set of blame-avoiding tactics falls under the rubric of policy
strategies.292 Such blame avoidance may be achieved by policies that reduce
the chance of avoidable harm occurring, or reduce the chance that avoidable
harm will be detected or easily traced.293
The policies designed to avoid blame can be substantive or procedural.
Substantive policies directly affect rights and obligations, such as laws
pertaining to the requirements of lawful admission, grounds for immigration
removal, sanctuary policies, macrolevel federal enforcement policies, and so
on. Procedural policies, by contrast, denote operational protocols, so that any
resulting harms can be met with a ready-packaged excuse of having ticked
all the boxes.294 For instance, procedural rights for immigrants can minimize
errors in administrative adjudication, and thus minimize the risk of being
blamed for mistakes like deporting U.S. citizens.295 And, insofar as such
errors occur, robust protocols may allow the agency to avoid some blame on
the basis (i.e., excuse) that it had followed established procedure.296
Likewise, the use of federal databases, which underlays SComm, can
eliminate or reduce subfederal discretionary choices about which migrants to
refer to federal immigration officials.297 By reducing discretion through
automation, the federal government may hope to avoid being blamed for
delegating too much discretion to subfederal officials; meanwhile, subfederal
290. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2012) (authorizing the outsourcing of immigration detention);
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1346, 1371 (2014).
291. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a), (e) (2012); Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in
the Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1110–13 (2009).
292. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 91–107 (cataloguing and discussing a broad range of
blame-avoiding policy strategies).
293. See generally id.
294. See Hood, supra note 3, at 170–71.
295. Cf. Meredith Hoffman, The US Keeps Mistakenly Deporting Its Own Citizens, VICE
NEWS (Mar. 8, 2016), https://news.vice.com/article/the-us-keeps-mistakenly-deporting-itsown-citizens [https://perma.cc/9FW8-6ZET].
296. See, e.g., Wendy Feliz, U.S. Settles with 4-Year-Old U.S. Citizen They Wrongfully
Deported, IMMIGR. IMPACT (July 2, 2015), http://immigrationimpact.com/2015/07/02/
u-s-settles-with-4-year-old-u-s-citizen-they-wrongfully-deported/ [https://perma.cc/AN977CAZ].
297. See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text (discussing the SComm program).
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officials might avoid blame for alerting federal authorities, on the excuse that
the information was automatically shared in the normal course of
operations.298
To be sure, in these and other examples, the underlying policies may be
ill-advised. But that is the part of the point: the policies that emerge from
institutional blame avoidance are sometimes ill-advised.
D. Limitations
All of the blame-avoidance strategies discussed above have situational
limits. For instance, the efficacy of presentational tactics depends on a range
of contextually contingent factors—including, most obviously, the
credibility (or not) of the information at issue, as well as the credibility (or
not) of the blamer and blamee. Thus, a blame avoider will not be excused if
the “facts” clearly show the blamee is culpable in the relevant sense.
Moreover, if a blame avoider always has some excuse, and never takes
responsibility, such tactics can have diminishing returns. Indeed, blame
avoidance can have negative returns; for instance, when a migrant’s or
official’s rhetorical attempt to avoid blame is deemed to be a blameworthy
act itself.299 Strategically minded advocates may thus self-regulate, and
perhaps limit, their presentational blame-avoidance tactics accordingly.
Agency strategies to avoid blame also have contextual limits. The
Constitution, statutes, administrative rules, and judicial doctrines place limits
on how government powers may be organized and operationalized.300 Even
within the bounds of law, reshuffling formal lines of authority—through
delegation, governmental partnerships, or otherwise—will not invariably
deflect blame. For instance, key constituents can hold members of Congress
responsible for delegating a decision.301 Similarly, a president who
relinquishes control over an issue may be blamed for not taking a more
hands-on approach.302

298. Cf. Martin, supra note 272, at 443 (explaining that “key federal officials viewed
[SComm] as presenting fewer risks of inappropriate [local enforcement] behavior than, for
example, Section 287(g) task force agreements, because local officers have no occasion to
make immigration status decisions as part of the [SComm] process; they were expected simply
to continue making arrests for crimes within their own clear jurisdiction”). As it turned out,
however, other discretionary aspects of the process—including which individuals to arrest in
the first place, whether to honor subsequent federal detainer requests, and which arrestees to
deport—attracted considerable amounts of institutional blame. See id. at 439–43 (discussing
the causes and effects of these programmatic snags); see also Hiroshi Motomura, The
Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the
Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 1153–57 (2011).
299. The Trump administration’s attempt to pin responsibility for family separation on
other institutional actors is a case in point. See infra notes 357–60 and accompanying text.
300. See supra Part I.B.
301. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 75.
302. Under that scenario, a strategically minded president might become actively involved
because, if blame is going to attach anyway, the White House might gain credibility (or even
credit) for taking ownership of hard decisions. See ELLIS, supra note 239, at 169–70.
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Policy tactics have their limits too, which may be reached when there are
no blame-free or low-blame options available.
For instance, the
advancement of a particular policy may attract blame from key constituents,
whereas an alternative policy may attract blame from the same (or other)
constituents. In these scenarios, policymakers may endeavor to select the
least-worst options, but some institutional blame is inevitable. Moreover,
when blame games are set to multiplayer mode—as they invariably are in the
immigration context—attempts to avoid blame will be limited by the efficacy
of blame avoidance counterstrategies.
Finally, as earlier discussed, blame attribution can be heavily influenced
by cultural worldviews.303 For many of the same reasons, the efficacy of
blame avoidance can be culturally contingent. Depending on cultural
context, people’s worldviews can make them more or less likely to give
uptake to different blame-avoiding tactics. For example, all else equal, an
excuse from an administrative official that “I was just following the
President’s orders” is far more likely to register with hierarchists than with
egalitarians. Meanwhile, an excuse from an undocumented migrant that she
came to America for a better life is more likely to register with individualists
(for whom individuals are expected to secure their own needs) than with
hierarchists (who are comfortable with social stratification and intolerant of
lawbreaking).304
IV. DYNAMIC IMMIGRATION BLAME
Thus far, I have identified and explained four operative features of
immigration blame: (1) migrant blame; (2) institutional blame; (3) blame
attribution; and (4) blame avoidance. This Part coordinates them into a
dynamic model. It then applies the model to a set of illustrative case studies,
which build on and connect some earlier examples.
A. Piecing It Together
As modeled here, the features of immigration blame are both substantive
and process oriented. Substantively, migrant blame and institutional blame
involve judgments about whether migrants and public officials are
responsible for avoidable harm. Along the process dimension, blame
attribution involves cognitive and expressive acts of blaming others, while
blame avoidance involves a range of tactics to evade, refute, disperse, and
mitigate attributions of blame.
The matrix below captures these dimensions, with thumbnail examples of
each:
303. See supra Part II.C.
304. Cf. Kahan, supra note 147, at 153–54 (summarizing the general preferences of cultural
worldviews). As far as I am aware, immigration regulation has not been the subject of any
empirical studies in cultural cognition. But, for studies in other hot-button areas—including
gun control, abortion, and global warming—which may provide theoretical support, see
generally id. and CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCHOOL,
http://www.culturalcognition.net/ [https://perma.cc/75AS-NUE2] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018).
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Migrant Blame

Blame Attribution





Blame Avoidance





Institutional Blame

Blaming lawful migrants for 
stealing jobs
Blaming undocumented
migrants for “cutting the

line”
Narratives and metaphors
depicting migrants at odds
with American culture and

values
Statistical reports showing
how migrants boost the
economy
Excuses and justifications
for amnesty
Narratives about
hardworking, family-centric
migrants
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Blaming the Executive for
unilateral immigration
policies
Blaming state officials for
cooperating, or for not
cooperating, with federal
officials
Blaming agency officials
for how they exercise
delegated and discretionary
enforcement power
Deflecting institutional
blame by blaming other
public officials
Delegating authority to
federal, state, and local
officials
Designing policies to
appease key constituents,
principals, or peers

Unpacking immigration blame is an important starting point for
understanding the myriad ways that blame permeates the immigration
system. But of more consequence is how these blame dynamics operate in
tandem, churning the politics, policies, and structures of immigration law.
As theorized here, institutional blame is often linked to migrant blame. All
else equal, as dominant perceptions of migrant blame increase, so too does
the risk of institutional blame for taking favorable action toward the migrants
at issue. That correlation, in turn, triggers other dynamics. Among them,
migrants have pragmatic incentives to avoid blame. Often, that blame
avoidance will implicate other migrants, public officials, and
nongovernmental actors (such as policy entrepreneurs and media
personalities). In addition, migrant blame avoidance often involves pinning
blame on structural or situational causes (such as dysfunctional or immoral
immigration controls, conditions in the home or host country, and so on).
Meanwhile, public officials have their own incentives to manage their risk of
institutional blame, and do so through a range of presentational, agency, and
policy strategies.305
As a purely descriptive matter, these iterative dynamics have catalyzing
effects on the operation and design choices of the U.S. immigration system.

305. See supra Part III.
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B. Law as Input and Output
Before proceeding to the case studies, it is worth emphasizing that
immigration blame entails more than rhetoric and political posturing. The
law, too, is implicated in various ways.
First, as input, the law informs perceptions relating to avoidable harm and
responsibility, which are the key ingredients of blame attribution. As earlier
noted, a legal violation or its effects may be deemed a blameworthy harm;
meanwhile, legal structures may rule in (or rule out) the responsible agents.
It must also be appreciated that a legal violation is neither necessary nor
sufficient for blame to attach. On the one hand, a legal violation is not
necessary because lawful action may nevertheless be deemed morally,
socially, or politically blameworthy. Thus, for example, lawful migrants are
often blamed for not “assimilating,” while law-abiding legislators are blamed
for bad immigration policies. On the other hand, a legal violation may not
be sufficient for blame to attach because different laws carry different moral,
social, and political significance.
For instance, it is one thing for a migrant to unlawfully enter the country,
which some people may tolerate or justify. Yet it is quite another if that
migrant commits a violent crime while unlawfully present, which most
people do not condone. Likewise, it is one thing for a public official to
violate a procedural technicality. Yet it is another thing when officials flout
clear constitutional mandates. Depending on one’s perspective and the
circumstances of the legal violation, blame might attach in all of these
examples, or it might not attach in any of them. That is because legal
violations may sometimes be excused or justified on moral or political
grounds, even if not on purely legalistic grounds.306 Thus, although a legal
violation is often considered a sufficient harm for purposes of attributing
blame, other considerations and normative predispositions may alter the
calculus.
As output, the law is a byproduct of agency and policy blame-avoidance
strategies. More specifically, the iterative dynamics of attributing and
avoiding blame can manifest in the creation, maintenance, or dismantling of
institutional structures and policies.307 Consider, for example, strategic
delegations of authority and partnership arrangement. By their very design,
the structures of decisional authority will be affected. Similarly, policies may
be pursued to avoid blame, in ways that affect legal rights and obligations of
migrants and public officials.
Importantly, the legal inputs and outputs of immigration blame often
relate. For instance, as input, the law may assign which public officials bear
306. The public controversies orbiting President Obama’s and President Trump’s signature
immigration programs are prime examples of how perceptions of law feed perceptions of
political harm and responsibility. See infra Part IV.C.2. See generally David S. Rubenstein,
Taking Care of the Rule of Law, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 168 (2018) (canvassing the legal and
political debates over Obama’s and Trump’s respective immigration initiatives).
307. See supra Parts III.B–C (offering examples); infra Part IV.C (offering additional
examples).
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legal responsibility for causing or fixing a perceived problem with the
immigration system. In turn, the legal question of who decides often affects
the output of what is decided. Owing to different constituencies and
accountabilities, Congress may decide matters differently than the president
or courts, which may decide differently than agency heads or frontline
enforcement agents, which may decide differently than states or cities, and
so on.308
C. Case Studies
To further develop and illustrate these points, the discussion below delves
more deeply into the subjects of (1) amnesty; (2) executive enforcement
policies under the Obama and Trump administrations; (3) the plenary power
doctrine and its application to Trump’s travel ban; and (4) immigration
federalism.309
1. Amnesty
The dominant anti-amnesty narrative characterizes undocumented
migrants as blameworthy lawbreakers, whose cheating of the system should
neither be rewarded nor countenanced.310 For reasons already explained,
these characterizations are contestable on the merits. Here, however, my
focus is on the relationship between migrant blame and institutional blame.
The more that undocumented migrants are depicted and perceived as
blameworthy, the more institutional blame legislators will face for granting
amnesty.
The ongoing saga over DREAM Act proposals is revealing in this and
related respects. Since at least 2001, the so-called Dreamers have received
special legislative consideration for amnesty.311 In large measure, that is
because most Dreamers have compelling excuses: their parents brought them
here as children, and this is the only life they know. If any subpopulation of
undocumented migrants deserve a chance at amnesty, the Dreamers arguably
top the list.312 Even if Dreamers are not completely blameless, the innocence
308. See generally David S. Rubenstein, Black-Box Immigration Federalism, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 983 (2016) (studying the relationship between who decides, and what is decided, in the
immigration federalism context). Local jurisdictions may decide questions of crime-based
deportation differently than the centralized federal government. See Daniel I. Morales,
Transforming Crime-Based Deportation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 745–64 (2017) (explaining
why and how such decisions are made, and arguing for decentralization on normative
grounds).
309. “Immigration federalism” refers to state and local regulations and their relationship to
federal controls. Included in this domain are sanctuary cities, as well as other cooperative and
uncooperative subfederal initiatives. Rubenstein, supra note 308, at 984 (discussing a range
of federalism issues implicated by the recent uptick in state and local immigration initiatives).
310. Bosniak, supra note 252, at 26–27.
311. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also Tal Kopan, Lawmakers Compete
to Carry President’s Mantle on DACA as Talks Continue, CNN (Jan. 11, 2018),
http://www.cnn.com/2018/01/10/politics/daca-latest-talks/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
75UM-YHHN].
312. Cf. Balara, supra note 268.
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narrative depicts them as less blameworthy than other undocumented
migrants (including, somewhat problematically, their parents).313
The DREAM Act saga also helps to make another, finer, point. If
Dreamers are ostensibly “blameless,” then why have they not yet received
amnesty? Surely, politics and a cumbersome legislative process are parts of
the answer.314 But another part is found at the intersection of negativity bias
and blame.315 To be “blameworthy” implies a negative departure from
behavioral norms. To be “blameless,” however, is generally neutral—it is
simply the absence of blame. That being so, the innocence narrative has its
limits.
It puts Dreamers in their own category for legislative
consideration.316 Still, more is needed for legislative grace under current
sociopolitical conditions. A positive narrative—something that makes
Dreamers praiseworthy, or otherwise beneficial to America’s welfare—is a
push in the right direction. But therein lies the rub. Narratives depicting
Dreamers as hardworking and beneficial to the country can also be said for a
much larger pool of amnesty seekers.317 Yet, coming full circle, as the pool
of amnesty beneficiaries expands to include more “blameworthy” migrants
(e.g., the “lawbreakers” and “cheaters”),318 the risk of institutional blame for
granting amnesty increases too.
Emphatically, this blame-centric gloss is not an alternative to political or
structural explanations for why the DREAM Act has languished in Congress

313. See Fanny Lauby, Leaving the ‘Perfect DREAMer’ Behind? Narratives and
Mobilization in Immigration Reform, 15 SOC. MOVEMENT STUD. 374, 375 (2016) (arguing that
“the use of the ‘perfect DREAMer’ narrative has led to the marginalization of other
undocumented migrants who have been implicitly constructed as less deserving because of
their age or level of education”).
314. See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, After 16 Futile Years, Congress
Will Try Again to Legalize ‘Dreamers,’ N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/09/05/us/politics/dream-act-daca-trump-congress-dreamers.html [https://perma.cc/3X
4F-D25R] (discussing sixteen years of failed efforts to pass the DREAM Act); Rachel Weiner,
How Immigration Reform Failed, Over and Over, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/30/how-immigration-reformfailed-over-and-over/ [https://perma.cc/8L94-2YAC]; see also William M. Eskridge, Jr.,
Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–48 (2008) (describing
a range of “vetogates” in the legislative process that stifle a bill’s passage into law).
315. See supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text (discussing negativity bias).
316. See Richard V. Rodriguez & Gidget Benitez, Congress Must Move Forward with the
Bridge Act to Prevent Deportation of DREAMers, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress-must-move-forward-with-the-bridge-act-toprevent-deportation-of-dreamers_us_59147e39e4b066b42171d9d0 [https://perma.cc/5G6G9MCA]; see also supra notes 258, 261, 314 (discussing and citing DREAM Act proposals in
Congress).
317. Cf. Lauby, supra note 313, at 374–75, 380–81; Benjamin Harris, Why Your Economic
Argument Against Immigration Is Probably Wrong, FORTUNE (Sept. 11, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/09/11/daca-immigration-economy-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc/
2DNB-J6ZL]; Rodriguez & Benitez, supra note 316.
318. Cf. Press Release, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Collateral Damage: President’s
Unilateral Actions Punish Legal Immigrants (Dec. 4, 2014), http://judiciary.house.gov/
index.cfm/press-releases?id=21782655-651B-44F9-8230-FBAA001EA0C5 [http://perma.cc/
UJB8-KQC6].
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for nearly two decades.319 Rather, my suggestion is that blame dynamics
offer a new way to understand the political results.
Also worth emphasizing here is that one legislator’s risk of institutional
blame may be another legislator’s opportunity for political credit. Thus, an
amnesty program might attract institutional blame for one legislator and
garner praise for a different legislator. Meanwhile, funding a border wall
might carry inverse political risk and credit for these lawmakers.
Aggregating the two policies together thus can have offsetting effects, which
potentially makes a deal possible. Again, however, this is where negativity
bias can be cognitively and politically distorting. First, as voters, our own
negativity bias may cause us to feel more displeasure with what is given up
in a deal than satisfaction with what is gained.320 Moreover, a legislator may
assume that constituent perceptions are skewed by negativity bias, even if
they are not. Thus, if a legislator thinks that key constituents are more likely
to vote out of displeasure than pleasure,321 the legislator may be skewed
toward blame-avoiding rather than credit-claiming policies and packages.
2. Executive Immigration Enforcement (and Nonenforcement)
The still-unfolding DACA saga offers another iteration of these themes but
captures some additional dynamics worth elaborating on. Whereas amnesty
is an issue for Congress to decide (subject to the president’s veto),322 DACA
involves the Executive in a significantly different way. More specifically,
DACA raises questions about the Executive’s power to categorically defer
enforcement of Congress’s laws that are already on the books.323 When the
political branches are at loggerheads, the cat-and-mouse dynamics of
immigration blame take new twists.
As earlier noted, President Obama and his top officials repeatedly
renounced authority to unilaterally grant relief to undocumented migrants
during his first presidential term.324 From the start, however, Obama was
caught in a political pickle. Legal authority or not, Obama’s political base
routinely blamed him for not protecting the Dreamers and, more generally,

319. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
320. Again, what qualifies as “gains” and “losses” in this context depends on what the
reference point is, and how it and the deal around it is rhetorically framed. See supra notes
222–27 and accompanying text (discussing framing effects).
321. See Weaver, supra note 13, at 373–77 (modeling this voting behavior around
negativity bias).
322. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (requiring congressional bills be presented to the president for
veto).
323. Between 2012 and 2017, approximately 800,000 individuals were granted DACA
benefits. See Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, by
Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Case Status: Fiscal Year 2012–2017, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. 1 (June 30, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All%20For
m%20Types/DACA/daca_performancedata_fy2017_qtr3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9J6E-TCUH]
[hereinafter Number of I-821D].
324. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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for not fulfilling his campaign pledge of comprehensive immigration
reform.325
During his second term, President Obama proclaimed that he would no
longer “wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress,” which was not
doing its job.326 In June 2012, that ambition sprang to life with the DACA
program.327 DACA provides “deferred action” and employment eligibility
to undocumented migrants who were brought to the country as children.328
Deferred action is a type of limbo status; it suspends unlawful presence but
does not confer lawful status.329 In 2012, the number of eligible DACA
beneficiaries was estimated to fall between one and two million.330
The White House knew that DACA would be a blame-avoiding policy visà-vis its Democratic base. But wider popular support was contingent on the
efficacy of supporting presentational tactics. Toward that end, President
Obama stressed the innocence of the Dreamer population.331 Moreover, he
argued that DACA was the right thing to do not only for these youths but also
for the country, which would benefit economically and otherwise from their
social integration.332 Beyond these justifications, President Obama’s “We
Can’t Wait” slogan implied that someone had to act and, because Congress
was not doing its job, the Executive should pick up the mantle.333
Putting aside whether DACA was justified on the merits, President
Obama’s decision to blame Congress was entirely strategic. Needless to say,
members of Congress did not want to be blamed either. And they, too, had
excuses and justifications: the country was deeply divided over immigration

325. Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part II: Faithfully Executing the Law,
19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 213, 268–69 (2015).
326. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on the Economy and
Housing (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/24/remarkspresident-economy-and-housing [https://perma.cc/QV94-PBNU] (“So I’m here to say to all
of you . . . we can’t wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they
won’t act, I will.”).
327. See DACA Memo, supra note 225; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks
by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration [https://perma.cc/QSK7-Z5BK]
(“Effective immediately, the Department of Homeland Security is taking steps to lift the
shadow of deportation from these young people.”).
328. DACA Memo, supra note 225.
329. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 709, 713–
15 (2015).
330. Fact Sheet: Who and Where the DREAMers Are, Revised Estimates, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL (Oct. 16, 2012), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/who-andwhere-dreamers-are-revised-estimates [https://perma.cc/BJ2G-NEG7].
331. See, e.g., Barack Obama, A Nation of Laws and a Nation of Immigrants, TIME (June
17, 2012), http://ideas.time.com/2012/06/17/a-nation-of-laws-and-a-nation-of-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/FZH2-6ZLX] (writing in support of DACA).
332. See id.
333. Cf. David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 43–44
(2014) (describing Obama’s initiative as a self-help measure, and normatively defending the
practice). But cf. David S. Rubenstein, Self-Help Structuralism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1619, 1650–
59 (2015) (extending Pozen’s ideas to include federalism, and critiquing constitutional selfhelp on normative grounds).
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reform, including with respect to the Dreamers.334 Congressional inaction
was thus arguably quite consistent with their legislative role. Further, some
members of Congress sought to reverse the blame coming from the White
House. According to congressional conservatives, President Obama was not
doing his constitutional job of “tak[ing] Care” to “faithfully execute”
Congress’s laws.335
Comparing DACA to the Obama administration’s subsequent deferredaction program, DAPA, further showcases the connections between migrant
blame and institutional blame.336 Under DAPA, undocumented parents of
U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents would be eligible for deferred
action if certain requirements were met.337 Like DACA, DAPA beneficiaries
would be considered lawfully present in the United States for renewable
periods and eligible for work authorization.338 An estimated four million
undocumented migrants might have qualified for DAPA (had it not been
judicially enjoined).339
Obama’s presentational blame-avoidance tactics were on full display when
he announced DAPA during a primetime, nationally broadcast speech from
the White House.340 To justify DAPA (and DACA) on policy grounds,
Obama offered this to the viewing public:
Even as we are a nation of immigrants, we’re also a nation of laws.
Undocumented workers broke our immigration laws, and I believe they
must be held accountable—especially those who may be dangerous. That’s
why, over the past six years, deportations of criminals are up 80 percent.
And that’s why we’re going to keep focusing enforcement resources on
actual threats to our security. Felons, not families. Criminals, not children.
Gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to provide for her kids.
We’ll prioritize, just like law enforcement does every day.341

334. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
335. See U.S. CONST. art. II; see also Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on
Immigration: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5–6 (2015)
(statement of Rep. Trey Gowdy, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“If this President’s
unilateral extraconstitutional acts are not stopped, future Presidents, you may rest assured, will
expand that power of the executive branch, thereby threatening the constitutional
equilibrium.”).
336. See generally DAPA Memo, supra note 225.
337. See id. at 4.
338. Id. at 2–4.
339. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam) (affirming,
without opinion, the Fifth Circuit’s preliminary injunction of DAPA in Texas v. United States,
805 F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015)); Press Release, Migration Policy Inst., As Many as 3.7
Million Unauthorized Immigrants Could Get Relief from Deportation Under Anticipated New
Deferred Action Program (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/mpi-many37-million-unauthorized-immigrants-could-get-relief-deportation-under-anticipated-new
[https://perma.cc/52LC-6RYL].
340. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in Address to the
Nation on Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-immigration
[https://perma.cc/8JLL4QT6].
341. Id.
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In this short snippet, notice how much is happening through a
presentational lens. The mention of criminals and gang members changes
the reference point, thus positioning the hardworking mom in a more
favorable light. At the same time, by stressing the Obama administration’s
hawkish deportation policies against more blameworthy migrants, the White
House hoped to offset institutional blame for DAPA. His analogy to
everyday law enforcement was in the same blame-avoiding spirit (although
it was a stretch).342
Through a blame lens, the timing of Obama’s announcements of DACA
and DAPA is also telling. The former was announced in the summer of 2012,
a few months prior to Obama’s bid for reelection. This was no coincidence.
Whether to gain credit or avoid blame, the White House’s political calculus
was that DACA would improve President Obama’s electoral prospects.343
By contrast, DAPA was announced immediately after the 2014 midterm
elections.344 This was no coincidence either. The political calculus for
DAPA was that the backlash from Republican voters could hurt the electoral
prospects of Democratic candidates who were competing for congressional
seats.345 By waiting to announce DAPA until after the midterm elections,
the White House could avoid being blamed by Democrats for jeopardizing
their chances.
But why was that the political calculus for DAPA? Substantively, DACA
and DAPA were near equivalents. True, DAPA covered many more people.
But if DACA was perceived as a credit-gaining program, then why would a
bigger program not gain even more institutional credit? The missing link, I
suggest, is blame. Generally speaking, public perceptions of migrant blame
surrounding adult undocumented migrants was greater than for the Dreamer
population. That being so, the risk of institutional blame for granting legal
reprieve to the adult population was greater too.

342. Obama’s analogy to everyday law enforcement elides the scope of DAPA. See
generally DAPA Memo, supra note 225. If implemented, the program would have offered
millions of undocumented migrants the opportunity to legally work in the country and be
eligible for certain social-security benefits (which arguably is not the stuff of everyday law
enforcement). See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 21–31, Texas v. United
States, No. 1:18-cv-00068 (S.D. Tex. May 2, 2018) (discussing the downstream legal
implications of DAPA and DACA, beyond mere nonenforcement).
343. See Lauren Gilbert, Obama’s Ruby Slippers: Enforcement Discretion in the Absence
of Immigration Reform, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 255, 261 (2013).
344. See, e.g., Jennifer Epstein, ‘Come Out of the Shadows’: Obama, At Last, Unveils
Sweeping Action on Immigration, POLITICO (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.politico.com/
story/2014/11/obama-immigration-action-113072 [https://perma.cc/8LBA-6KWS] (“The
president’s moves reflect a second-term White House that is fed up with congressional
dysfunction and that, with the midterm elections behind them, no longer has to worry about
the immediate political fallout for Democrats on the ballot.”).
345. See Julie Pace, Why It Took 6 Years for Obama to Act on Immigration, PBS (Nov. 21,
2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/heres-why-it-took-6-years-for-obama-to-acton-immigration [https://perma.cc/F7WP-VMBJ] (“The move came in response to requests
from nervous Democrats who feared the controversial actions could upend their chances of
keeping control of the Senate.”).
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Now, under the Trump administration, some of these dynamics are
unfolding in reverse. Although his administration’s repeal of DAPA was met
with public criticism,346 it paled in comparison to the intensity of institutional
blame sparked by Trump’s subsequent decision to repeal DACA.347 One
reason for this asymmetry, I have already suggested, is the compelling force
of the innocence narrative in public discourse. But Trump’s reversal of
Obama’s signature deferred-action programs presents an opportunity to tease
out and connect some additional points.
First, ending DAPA was not widely felt as a “loss” because it never went
into effect.348 By contrast, DACA did go into effect and was granted to
approximately 800,000 Dreamers.349 Thus, from the vantage of DACA
recipients (and their allies), the prospect of ending the program was perceived
and weighted quite differently. This is a framing effect.350 Owing to
negativity bias (and loss aversion), the psychological impulse to avoid
DACA’s loss is greater than if the program had never been implemented in
the first place.
Second, and relatedly, the innocence narrative resonates differently in this
context than it does in the amnesty context.351 The absence of blame may
not be a strong prompt for favorable government action. Yet, at the very
least, being blameless is arguably a reason for neutral government action.
Framed as a “loss,”352 DACA’s repeal will strike many observers as
unfavorable government action toward blameless migrants. This is a recipe
for institutional blame. Moreover, in the enforcement setting, the loss is
compounded by an additional framing effect: there are millions of more
346. See Memorandum from John F. Kelly, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
K. McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/97XW-CUS6]; Tal Kopan, Trump Administration Reverses DAPA in ‘House
Cleaning,’ CNN (June 16, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/16/politics/dhs-scraps-dapakeeps-daca-deferred-action/index.html [https://perma.cc/AHP9-CF36].
347. See Memorandum from Elaine Duke, Acting Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
James W. McCament, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al.
(Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca
[https://perma.cc/2YL3-NSG7] [hereinafter Memo from Elaine Duke]; Jennifer Rubin,
Ending DACA Would Be Trump’s Most Evil Act, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/09/04/trump-ending-dacawould-be-cruelty-wrapped-in-a-web-of-lies/ [https://perma.cc/29WT-FVYF]; Michael D.
Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to End DACA and Calls on Congress to Act,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/politics/trump-dacadreamers-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/6MCA-E6AL]; Derek Thompson, The
Economic Senselessness of President Trump’s DACA Repeal, ATLANTIC (Sept. 5, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/09/trump-daca-repeal/538911/
[https://perma.cc/C37R-38FK].
348. See supra notes 339, 346 and accompanying text.
349. See Number of I-821D, supra note 323, at 1.
350. Trump’s repeals of DAPA and DACA can both be framed as losses; they can also be
framed as a return to the pre-2012 status quo. Yet, as between these alternative framings, it
seems most natural to frame the repeal of DACA as a “loss” and the repeal of DAPA as more
neutral.
351. See supra Part IV.C.1.
352. See supra notes 349–50 and accompanying text.
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blameworthy migrants at-large to expend limited government resources on.
Put otherwise, spending resources to deport DACA-eligible migrants seems
irrational, if not also unfair, when the migrant blame lens is expanded.
Thus, as might be expected, Trump’s blame-avoiding approach with
respect to DACA was replete with presentational and policy tactics. In one
tweeted breath, Trump first announced DACA’s suspension and redirected
would-be blamers to Congress: “Congress, get ready to do your job—
DACA!”353 A few hours later, Trump responded to a firestorm of public
protest with a second tweet: “Congress now has 6 months to legalize DACA
(something the Obama Administration was unable to do). If they can’t, I will
revisit this issue!”354 Put otherwise, Trump’s message to America was:
blame Congress, blame Obama, but do not blame Trump—at least not yet.355
Further, the choice to provide a six-month phase-out period for DACA,
rather than terminate the program outright, was likely an attempt to minimize
blame.356 The very anticipation of being blamed, it seems, had some effect
on the politics and policies surrounding DACA’s suspension.
For another illustration, return to the family-separation crisis still
unfolding under the Trump administration. As earlier noted, more than two
thousand migrant children were separated from parents who were
apprehended at or near the border in 2018.357 Although family separations
occurred under prior administrations,358 the practice ballooned in scope
under the Trump administration and drew far greater public attention and
As pressure mounted, the Trump administration denied
scorn.359
responsibility for family separation and tried to pin it elsewhere.360
More specifically, per the Trump administration, the proper targets of
blame were: (1) the Democrats, who passed the “horrible” laws requiring

353. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2017, 5:04 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/905038986883850240 [https://perma.cc/CDQ3J9Q3].
354. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 5, 2017, 5:38 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/905228667336499200 [https://perma.cc/6AYATU2E].
355. As of this writing, lower courts to address the issue have enjoined the Trump
administration’s repeal of DACA, on the ground that the repeal was “arbitrary and capricious”
under the Administrative Procedure Act. See generally, e.g., NAACP v. Trump, 315 F. Supp.
3d 457 (D.D.C. 2018); New York v. Trump, No. 16-CV-4756, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23547
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2018); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F.
Supp. 3d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
356. Memo from Elaine Duke, supra note 347 (phasing out DACA and calling for its
repeal).
357. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
358. See Brian Sonenstein, Separation of Immigrant Families Was Part of Deportation
Under Obama—Now Trump Is Expanding the Practice, SHADOWPROOF (June 15, 2018),
https://shadowproof.com/2018/06/15/separation-immigrant-families-part-deportationobama-now-trump-expanding-practice/ [https://perma.cc/G8VJ-3H29].
359. See Rucker et al., supra note 274.
360. See, e.g., Kevin Liptak et al., White House Scrambles to Contain Immigration Fallout,
CNN (June 18, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/immigration-white-housepressure/index.html [https://perma.cc/R8ZR-W79C].
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family separation and who were obstructing legislative fixes;361 (2) the
judiciary, which had previously prohibited the detention of migrant children
with their parents;362 and (3) undocumented parents, who not only entered
the country illegally, but also exposed their children to life-threatening
dangers.363
For a variety of reasons, the Trump administration’s attempts to divert
institutional blame were unsuccessful.364
To begin, the Trump
administration’s account of institutional responsibility was not credible.365
Family separation is the result of a conflation of laws and policies, but they
are not Democratic laws and policies. One of the key laws, the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), requires that
unaccompanied migrant children be placed in the custody of the Department
of Health and Human Services.366 TVPRA was passed by a unanimous
Congress and signed into law by Republican President George W. Bush.367
Moreover, the judicial orders and decrees at issue—commonly referred to
as the “Flores Agreement”—limit the federal government’s ability to detain
migrant children.368 But the Flores Agreement does not require that parents
be criminally prosecuted, much less incarcerated, when they are
361. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2018, 6:59 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1000375761604370434 [https://perma.cc/2JWNZ7C8].
362. See, e.g., Dara Lind & Dylan Scott, Flores Agreement: Trump’s Executive Order to
End Family Separation Might Run Afoul of a 1997 Court Ruling, VOX (June 20, 2018,
3:20 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/6/20/17484546/executive-order-family-separationflores-settlement-agreement-immigration
[https://perma.cc/7T6T-C7EL]
(“The
administration has fingered Flores v. Reno, or the ‘Flores settlement,’ as the reason it is
‘forced’ to separate parents from their children to prosecute them.”).
363. See Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks on the Illegal
Immigration Crisis (June 18, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/06/18/dhs-secretarynielsens-remarks-illegal-immigration-crisis [https://perma.cc/9WDC-WCHZ] (“[P]arents
who entered illegally are—by definition—criminals. . . . By entering our country illegally—
often in dangerous circumstances—illegal immigrants have put their children at risk.”); see
also Border Security Loopholes Drive Massive Surge in Unaccompanied Alien Children,
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES 1, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/fact-sheet-bordersecurity-loopholes.pdf [https://perma.cc/K77Z-47AA] (last visited Aug. 24, 2018) (stating
that Congress’s inability to pass legislation on border security “created perverse and dangerous
incentives for illegal border crossings and child smuggling”).
364. See, e.g., Liptak et al, supra note 360.
365. Id.; see Manuela Tobias, Donald Trump Blames Democrats for Own Immigration
Policy Separating Families, POLITIFACT (May 29, 2018), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2018/may/29/donald-trump/trump-blames-democrat-own-policyseparating-family/ [https://perma.cc/H4N4-ED2F].
366. 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (2012) (providing that “care and custody of all unaccompanied alien
children, including responsibility for their detention, where appropriate, shall be the
responsibility of the Secretary of Health and Human Services” and its subagency, the Office
of Refugee Resettlement).
367. Kim & DeBonis, supra note 275.
368. The Flores Agreement requires the government to (1) place migrant children with a
close relative or guardian “without unnecessary delay” (generally no more than twenty days),
and (2) keep migrant children who are in custody in the “least restrictive setting” possible.
Stipulated Settlement Agreement at 7, 10, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 17, 1997).
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accompanied by their children at the border.369 Rather, the decisions to
prosecute parents and incarcerate them were operational features of the
Trump administration’s “zero-tolerance” policy, which took effect in the
spring of 2018.370
Properly understood, family separation resulted from a mix of causal
factors: the TVPRA, the Flores Agreement, the arriving parents’ unlawful
entry, and the Trump administration’s zero-tolerance policy.371 Despite the
legal nuances, it was clear enough to the general public that the Trump
administration was at least partly responsible for the family-separation
crisis.372 And, whatever the merits of the zero-tolerance policy, the Trump
administration clearly had (and still has) the discretionary authority to undo
it. Upon these realizations, the White House’s incredulous attempt to deflect
blame became a blameworthy act itself.373
What ultimately tipped the scales, however, were the unrelenting stories,
sounds, and images of suffering children.374 The Trump administration tried
its hand at publicizing more positive images of children playing video games,
attending classes, and living contently.375 Yet, unsurprisingly, the heartwrenching accounts of crying children dominated public perceptions,
including among many Republicans.376 As one journalist reported: “No
matter how much [Trump’s] base loves his tough-guy act on the border, the
sounds of little children crying for their parents was winning out.”377 This is
negativity bias at work.378
It is hard to overstate the impact these images and sounds had on
America’s collective psyche. Suffice to say, it was enough to cause the White
House to relent, at least in part. Under intense bipartisan pressure, Trump
signed an executive order prospectively halting family separation.379
Instead, the executive order called for family detention, whereby parents and
children would be detained together “to the extent permitted by law and
369. See generally id.
370. See Zero-Tolerance Memo, supra note 18.
371. Of course, depending on perspective, more might be added to this causal list: country
conditions in Central America, the Obama administration’s practice of “catch-and-release,”
and so on.
372. See, e.g., Liptak et al., supra note 360.
373. Id.
374. See, e.g., Chris Cillizza, The Sounds of Separation—How Eight Minutes of Audio
Changed the Immigration Debate, CNN (June 25, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/22
/politics/donald-trump-pro-publica-sound/index.html [https://perma.cc/8DF8-TFE6]; Miriam
Jordan, ‘It’s Horrendous’: The Heartache of a Migrant Boy Taken from His Father, N.Y.
TIMES (June 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/07/us/children-immigration-borders
-family-separation.html [https://perma.cc/5ZE9-9CD3].
375. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., UC Shelter in Brownsville, Texas—
June 13, 2018, YOUTUBE (June 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WyRu1PiPYIc
[https://perma.cc/CFU6-EHWF]; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., UC Shelter in San
Diego, California—June 13, 2018, YOUTUBE (June 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mHWKjUtbYtc [https://perma.cc/C896-FH8K].
376. See Cillizza, supra note 374.
377. Id.
378. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
379. See Exec. Order No. 13,841, 83 Fed. Reg. 29,435 (June 20, 2018).
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subject to the availability of appropriations.”380 The title of the executive
order—“Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address Family
Separation”—was a less-than-subtle attempt to redirect blame to
Congress.381
A section of the executive order also called upon the Attorney General to
seek a judicial modification of the Flores Agreement to allow family
detention.382 As of this writing, litigation over the Flores Agreement is still
pending.383 In the opening scene, however, federal Judge Dolly Gee flatly
ruled against the government’s request.384 Her closing dicta was striking,
and of special interest here.385 Loath to accept blame, Judge Gee lodged
institutional responsibility with Congress (for its “inaction”) and the
executive branch (for its “ill-considered” action).386 “Regardless,” Judge
Gee wrote, “what is certain is that the children . . . are blameless.”387 A
favorable judicial ruling for the government could make the court complicit,
and a target of blame, for their detention. Judge Gee understandably wanted
no piece of that.
Although it is too soon to say how the episodes discussed above will play
out, the dynamics of immigration blame have already left their mark on the
politics and policies under consideration.
3. The Plenary Power Doctrine (and the Travel Ban)
The literature on the Supreme Court’s plenary power doctrine is legion but
has never been studied through the prism of blame.388 This Article suggests
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. See Flores v. Sessions, No. 2:85-cv-04544 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2018). Under a separate
court order, efforts to reunite separated children with their parents are underway. See Ms. L.
v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, No. 18-cv-0428, 2018 WL 3129486, at *11 (S.D. Cal.
June 26, 2018).
384. Flores, slip op. at 7. Judge Gee wrote:
It is apparent that [the government’s] Application is a cynical attempt . . . to shift
responsibility to the Judiciary for over 20 years of Congressional inaction and illconsidered Executive action that have led to the current stalemate. The parties
voluntarily agreed to the terms of the Flores Agreement more than two decades ago.
The Court did not force the parties into the agreement nor did it draft the contractual
language. Its role is merely to interpret and enforce the clear and unambiguous
language to which the parties agreed, applying well-established principles of law.
Regardless, what is certain is that the children who are the beneficiaries of the Flores
Agreement’s protections and who are now in [government] custody are blameless.
They are subject to the decisions made by adults over whom they have no control.
In implementing the Agreement, their best interests should be paramount.
Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA.
L. REV. 29, 30 (2015) (“It almost seems an obligatory rite of passage for scholars embarking
on the study of immigration law to provide their own critique of plenary power or related
doctrines of deference.”). For an in-depth treatment of the descriptive and normative debates
over the plenary power doctrine, see Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 593–626.
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that the plenary power doctrine both shapes, and is shaped by, the dynamics
of immigration blame.389 To the extent that judges are politically insulated,
they may have less reason to avoid blame.390 But judges do have instincts
and incentives to avoid blame, whether for psychological, reputational, or
institutional reasons.391 Judge Gee’s remarks in the Flores litigation are a
stark example of judicial blame avoidance, egged on by the Trump
administration’s blaming of the court.392 Far from idiosyncratic, her instincts
are entirely natural. Indeed, if judicial legitimacy depends on public support,
then judges arguably should avoid blame in appropriate ways and
situations.393
Through these optics, the Supreme Court’s plenary power doctrine may be
understood as a self-preserving blame-avoidance strategy. The message
splayed across this anachronistic line of cases is unmistakable: aggrieved
parties should take their complaints to the federal political branches.394 Time
and again, the Court has invoked the plenary power doctrine to uphold federal
immigration laws that would be inconceivable in other regulatory

See also supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (summarizing the contours of the plenary
power doctrine).
389. See supra Part I.B (explaining how the doctrine can potentially rule in, and rule out,
which public officials to blame for perceived harms in the immigration system); infra Part
IV.C.3 (discussing how the plenary power doctrine may be viewed as a form of judicial blame
avoidance); infra Part V.D (discussing how revisions to the plenary power doctrine might limit
the political branches’ range of policy strategies for avoiding blame).
390. Weaver, supra note 13, at 376–77 (noting that while judges “might not like to be
blamed for unpopular decisions, they can withstand blame better than legislators and elective
and appointed officials in the executive branch”).
391. That judges are fallible and emotional humans combines the jurisprudential insights
of the Legal Realists, see, for example, BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 167–77 (1921) (asserting the relevance of the subconscious mind to judicial decisionmaking), and the more recent psychological insights discussed in Part II of this Article. That
judges may be responsive to blame, and seek to avoid it, also coheres with Professor Barry
Friedman’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decisions in the modern era are influenced by
public opinion. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14 (2009). Friedman argues that
the Court acts not just out of a fear that its decisions will be unpopular, but that its decisions
will not be put into action. But see Sanford Levinson, Courts as Participants in “Dialogue”:
A View from American States, 59 KAN. L. REV. 791, 795–96 (2011) (critiquing the connections
that Friedman draws between popular opinion and judicial outcomes).
392. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
393. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (“[T]o overrule
[Roe v. Wade] under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a
watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.”);
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF POLITICS 29–32 (2d ed. 1986). It is beyond this Article’s scope to specify when, and how,
it might be appropriate for judges to avoid blame. I do, however, offer some generalized
prescriptions in Part V that could serve as a starting point. See infra Part V.C (calling for and
outlining an “ethics of immigration blame”).
394. The original dictum comes from the foundational Chinese Exclusion Case: “If the
government of the country of which the foreigners excluded are subjects is dissatisfied with
this action it can make complaint to the executive head of our government . . . .” 130 U.S. 581,
606 (1889).
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contexts.395 Still, citing principles of stare decisis, the Court effectively
punts.396
In Galvan v. Press,397 for example, the Court explained that if it “we[re]
writing on a clean slate,” then perhaps the Due Process Clause would protect
the petitioner from the harsh deportation law at issue.398 Yet, the Court
stressed, “[T]he slate is not clean. . . . [T]here is not merely ‘a page of
history,’ but a whole volume.”399 The doctrinal slate is more marked today.
As earlier discussed, the Court in Trump v. Hawaii stressed that federal
immigration policy has been “largely immune” from constitutional review
“[f]or more than a century.”400
One might view these paeans to stare decisis as judicial minimalism. One
might also, however, view the Court’s appeals to stare decisis as a form of
blame avoidance: the judicial analog to a political official’s excuse that their
hands are tied.401 From reams of scholarly work, the Court already has ample
fodder to scrap the plenary power doctrine on the merits.402 Perhaps if the
doctrine attracts significantly more blame than it deflects, and if the Court
cares about such things (for the sake of its own legitimacy or otherwise), then
the impulse to avoid blame may tip the scales toward a normalized
immigration jurisprudence.403
Despite its potential, Trump v. Hawaii was not that case. To begin with,
the Court had no blame-free options: it would be widely blamed (by some)
for allowing Trump’s Proclamation to survive and widely blamed (by others)
for striking it down. From an institutional vantage, what was the least-worst
option for the Court? On the one hand, allowing the Proclamation to survive
exposes the Court to a certain type and intensity of blame. Justice
Sotomayor’s strongly worded dissent in Trump v. Hawaii, for example,
blames the Court’s majority for “ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal
precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation

395. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
396. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 n.4 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 766–67 (1972); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
397. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
398. Id. at 530–31 (upholding deportation on the basis of Communist Party membership).
399. Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
400. No. 17-965, slip op. at 30 (U.S. June 26, 2018) (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792).
401. Cf. id. at 32 n.5 (“The dissent criticizes application of a more constrained standard of
review as ‘throw[ing] the Establishment Clause out the window.’ But as the numerous
precedents cited in this section make clear, such a circumscribed inquiry applies to any
constitutional claim concerning the entry of foreign nationals.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion)).
402. In a nutshell, the plenary power doctrine has been attacked as both legally and morally
unjustified. For some of the early leading work, see, for example, STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY,
IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 177–222
(1987). For a collection and summary of decades of academic critique, see Rubenstein &
Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 615–18.
403. I will revisit this possibility in Part V, with some observations and suggestions for
how tweaking the plenary power doctrine might counter some pathologies of blame avoidance.
See infra Part V.D.
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inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United
States citizens.”404
On the other hand, however, imagine a counterfactual scenario in which
the Court enjoined the Proclamation and a terrorist attack occurs on
American soil within the next few years. According to many nationalsecurity experts, the likelihood that the Proclamation can prevent an attack is
extremely low.405 Still, in the hypothetical event of attack, it is almost certain
that the Court would be intensely (if not ruinously) blamed by large swaths
of the U.S. population. Owing to cognitive biases, people are highly prone
to blame decision makers for good decisions that turn out badly in
hindsight.406 When in doubt, maintaining the status quo is not only
consistent with the principle of stare decisis, it also generally attracts less
blame if things later go wrong.407
Indeed, anticipating a Supreme Court showdown, President Trump primed
this pump. Soon after his first travel ban was enjoined in federal district
court, President Trump took to Twitter: “Just cannot believe a judge would
put our country in such peril. If something happens blame him and court
system. People pouring in. Bad!”408
It is hard to know whether and how much the risk of institutional blame
factored into the Court’s decisional calculus in Trump v. Hawaii or in other
immigration cases. Nothing in my account here depends on it. As a purely
descriptive matter, and regardless of the Court’s motivations, the plenary
power doctrine provides the Court with some institutional cover—and has
“[f]or more than a century.”409 Staying the course is not a blame-free path
for the Court.410 For better or worse, however, the plenary power doctrine
hedges against the risk of other types and intensities of blame that might
follow if the Court were to assign itself a greater role in matters of federal
immigration and national security.
4. Immigration Federalism
If state and local officials were precluded from passing immigrationrelated laws, then they might plausibly deny responsibility for perceived
404. Trump, slip op. at 1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
405. Id. at 21–22 (“[S]everal former national-security officials from both political
parties . . . have advised that the Proclamation and its predecessor orders ‘do not advance the
national-security or foreign policy interests of the United States, and in fact do serious harm
to those interests.’”); Nina Totenberg, Why Dozens of National Security Experts Have Come
Out Against Trump’s Travel Ban, NPR (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/
2018/04/24/604949251/why-dozens-of-national-security-experts-have-come-out-againsttrumps-travel-ban [https://perma.cc/E3CT-QL43].
406. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 119, at 203–04 (discussing outcome bias and hindsight
bias).
407. Cf. id.
408. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828342202174668800 [https://perma.cc/64K2P3J9].
409. Trump, slip op. at 30.
410. See supra notes 402, 404 and accompanying text.
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immigration-related harms. As earlier discussed, however, the more the
federal government devolves immigration authority to state and local
jurisdictions, and the more these jurisdictions assert authority, the more
subfederal officials are exposed to institutional blame.411 In turn, the risk of
institutional blame triggers avoidance strategies by subfederal officials,
which then shape immigration policies on the ground.
For example, public officials in states and localities where undocumented
migration is perceived as harmful are more inclined to pass restrictionist
policies toward this population (for example, in Arizona and Texas).412
Meanwhile, states where undocumented migration is not perceived as
harmful are more inclined to pass laws that seek to integrate and welcome
these migrants (for example, in California and New York).413
Even within integrationist jurisdictions, state and local officials must
manage their risk of institutional blame. Return to the sanctuary city
example. Not all sanctuary policies are the same. They differ, I suggest,
because policy lines are drawn with an eye toward managing institutional
blame.414 Several major sanctuary jurisdictions, for example, make
distinctions between migrants who commit minor versus major crimes.415
Through blame spectacles, it is one thing for local law enforcement agencies
to release minor criminal offenders back into the general population; it is
quite another to release deportable drug dealers, rapists, and murderers.
Subfederal officials are keen to these distinctions, and they tailor their
sanctuary policies accordingly. Again, I am not suggesting that avoiding

411. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
412. See, e.g., City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 885 F.3d 332, 360 (5th Cir. 2018) (upholding a
Texas statute which forbids sanctuary policies by cities and localities within the state);
S. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ariz. 2010) (“The legislature declares that the intent of
this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy . . . . The provisions of this
act are intended to . . . discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens . . . .”).
The Supreme Court, in Arizona v. United States, invalidated portions of S.B. 1070, as it was
popularly known. 567 U.S. 387, 407–10 (2012). Other sections of the bill survived. See also
Ramakrishnan & Gulasekaram, supra note 66, at 1463–85 (describing restrictionist state and
local laws).
413. Examples of integrationist measures include sanctuary or noncooperation laws, and
laws that provide public benefits to unauthorized immigrants, such as in-state college tuition
or municipal identification cards. See Rodríguez, supra note 116, at 576; Karthick
Ramakrishnan & Allan Colbern, Opinion, Immigration Reform: ‘The California Package,’
L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0624-ramakrishnan
-state-citizenship-20150624-story.html [https://perma.cc/LY5U-AV9E] (explaining how
California has “encourage[ed] integration rather than deportation” through immigration
policies).
414. Cf. Natashia Tidwell, Fragmenting the Community: Immigration Enforcement and
the Unintended Consequences of Local Police Non-Cooperation Policies, 88 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 105, 142 (2014) (warning that “[w]hen discretionary policies are shaped by community
preferences, legitimacy lasts only as long as the next election cycle”).
415. See COOK COUNTY, ILL. § 46-37 (2018) (allowing detainer compliance where the
target of detainer is convicted of a serious or violent felony offense for which he or she is
currently in custody); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 9-131 (2018) (including
numerous crime-based exceptions to noncompliance with detainers); see also CAL. GOV’T
CODE §§ 7282.5(a), 7284.6(a)(4) (West 2018) (same).
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blame is the only consideration; just that it is an important one that helps to
explain (and perhaps justify) where sanctuary policy lines are drawn.416
*

*

*

Parts I through IV, above, provide a descriptive account of how the
conflation of migrant blame, institutional blame, blame attribution, and
blame avoidance, infuse immigration politics, policies, and structures.
Understanding immigration blame will not resolve differences in opinion
over how to fix the immigration system, which by all accounts is
metaphorically “broken.” Rather, this Article’s descriptive modeling hopes
to be empowering in at least three ways.
First, one cannot fully understand our immigration system, as it currently
exists, without understanding the dynamic pulls and pushes of immigration
blame. Sensitivity to these phenomena can enrich our understanding of
immigration law.
Second, any who aspire to improve the extant system—whether as
advocates, public officials, or voters—will need to account for immigration
blame, both strategically and ideologically. We are all participants, not just
victims, of immigration blame.417
Third, the study of immigration blame can instill new perspectives on
American values, both past and present. Which migrants to accept into our
national and local communities, and how to treat them under the law, are
reflections of who we are and hope to become as a nation.418 So too are our
decisions about which public officials to support and what to expect of them
in office. The normative and prescriptive implications of immigration blame
are taken up in Part V below. But those aspirations cannot be pursued, much
less realized, without having a steady grip on the mechanics and
machinations of immigration blame.
V. NORMATIVE AND PRESCRIPTIVE DIMENSIONS
If there is no way to harness or leverage immigration blame, then what it
ought to be is intriguing but inconsequential. Within legal and pragmatic
limits, however, there is reason to think—and hope—that we can do better.
Toward that objective, this Part: (1) makes the positive case for immigration

416. The same might be said when viewing these sanctuary policies through an “equity” or
“proportionality” lens. See generally Cade, supra note 15. Although Professor Cade’s equityproportionality theory is quite different than the immigration blame model developed here, the
two may overlap in this context. For example, in the sanctuary context, subfederal officials
may be blamed for lack of proportionality if their sanctuary policies do not differentiate
between nonviolent and violent criminal offenders, or blamed for interfering with federal
determinations about what is equitable and proportionate.
417. See infra Part V.C (sketching the outlines of what an “ethics of immigration blame”
should entail).
418. Cf. JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 171 (“Throughout U.S. history, the exclusion and
deportation provisions of the U.S. immigration laws have acted as a ‘magic mirror’ into the
domestic prejudices and biases in the nation’s heart and soul.”).
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blame;419 (2) argues for an “ethics of immigration blame”;420 and
(3) suggests ways that legal doctrines and structures might help to counter
some of immigration blame’s nocuous manifestations.421
A. Valuing Blame
When blame dynamics lead to dysfunctional or irrational outcomes, there
may be reason to blame blame. Yet when the same dynamics lead to
outcomes we favor, why not praise blame? More than ironic, this asymmetry
is telling: the same negativity bias that nourishes blame can cause us to
overlook or devalue blame’s constructive possibilities.
When done right, blame is essential to a well-functioning immigration
system. First, blame is a way to signal disapproval of harmful or wrongful
behavior by migrants and public officials.422 Indeed, sometimes blame is the
most appropriate response to violations of social, political, and legal
norms.423 It would not be fitting, for example, to feel only apathy (much less
pleasure) in reaction to a public official’s constitutional violation or in
reaction to a migrant’s violent crime. To not blame in these and other
situations could signal complacency, if not condonation of harmful or
wrongful behavior.424
Second, and relatedly, blame can serve an important dialogic function.425
Because blame is a normatively infused judgment of disapproval, it generally
calls for a response from the blamee.426 Any number of responses are
possible: denial of wrongdoing, an excuse, a justification, an apology, a
promise to act differently next time, and so on. When the blamee denies the
accusation of harm or wrongdoing, the blamer may be called upon to defend
the veracity and fairness of the accusation.427 For example, the excuses and
justifications proffered by pro-amnesty advocates return pressure on antiamnesty politicians and pundits to explain, or at least to consider, why the
proffered excuses and justifications are unconvincing. In this example, and
countless others, the dialogic process of attributing and avoiding blame can
419. See infra Part V.A–B.
420. See infra Part V.C.
421. See infra Part V.D.
422. See supra Part I (discussing migrant blame and institutional blame); cf. Jay R.
Wallace, Dispassionate Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments, in REASONS
AND RECOGNITION: ESSAYS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF T. M. SCANLON 348, 368 (2011) (noting
that blame may be “peculiarly appropriate” in a situation, and thus important to have in our
repertoire of reactions to wrongdoing).
423. Macalester Bell, The Standing to Blame: A Critique, in BLAME: ITS NATURE AND
NORMS, supra note 1, at 263, 268 (“Condemning wrongdoing is a central way for persons to
express their moral commitments and avoid condonation.”).
424. Id.
425. For parallel views in moral philosophy, which depict blame as a type of dialogical
exchange, see Victoria McGeer, Civilizing Blame, in BLAME: ITS NATURE AND NORMS, supra
note 1, at 162, 175 and see McKenna, supra note 45, at 119, 127–30, which analogizes blame
to a conversation, whereby blamer and blamee exchange ideas and make their respective cases.
426. See McGeer, supra note 425, at 162, 175.
427. See Kelly, supra note 248, at 244, 256 (“In evaluating an agent’s blameworthiness,
we assess how reasonable it is to expect an agent to act morally in the face of obstacles.”).
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force interlocutors to consider different perspectives.428 To be sure, the
respective parties may not be moved by the other’s viewpoint. What blame
dynamics can do, however, is bring those competing viewpoints to the same
table.429
Third, and perhaps most significantly, blame serves an important quasiregulative function. More specifically, actual or anticipated blame can
motivate better decisions and behaviors.430 Even if the blamee is unable or
unwilling to accept responsibility, there can still be public value in blame’s
signaling effects on how others should conduct themselves in the relevant
social, political, and legal communities.431
B. Blame-Avoidance Tradeoffs
In large measure, the normativity of blame avoidance is an extension of
the foregoing ideas. When blame avoidance is pursued with energy and
ingenuity, every harm is contested, and every line of responsibility
tangled.432 But, drawing on key insights from political science, perhaps we
can view blame-avoidance strategies as containing trade-offs, with
potentially positive variants that can enhance the quality of governance.433
Start with presentational strategies. If blame attribution is a process of
assigning responsibility for harm,434 then rhetorical tactics to avoid blame
can upset that social function.435 In many contexts, however, presentational
strategies might lead us to better information about whether the perceived
harm is, in fact, a harm. Moreover, presentational strategies can help direct
audiences to which individuals or entities are responsible for which harms,
thus countering misattributions of migrant blame and institutional blame.436
Relatedly, presentational strategies can be an effective counterweight to
heuristics and biases that would otherwise go unchallenged in public
discourse.437 For example, well-framed excuses and justifications can in
some cases better inform voters and public officials about the complexity of

428. See id. at 256–57.
429. Cf. McGeer, supra note 425, at 180 (arguing that the processes of laying and avoiding
blame “invariably work to develop the normative understanding of the putative wrongdoer,
the blamer, or both”).
430. See Paul Bloom, Forum Response: Beyond Blame, BOS. REV. (July 10, 2013),
http://bostonreview.net/forum/beyond-blame/paul-bloom-blame-motivates-good-behavior
[https://perma.cc/LSE3-NVBP] (“The thought of being blamed by others, and the associated
feelings of guilt and shame, can motivate good behavior.”); see also Cheshire Calhoun,
Responsibility and Reproach, 99 ETHICS 389, 406 (1989) (making the same point).
431. See Bell, supra note 423, at 263, 269.
432. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 184.
433. For an insightful and extended discussion of blame-avoidance trade-offs, from which
the discussion below draws, see id. at 144–74.
434. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
435. See supra Part III.A.
436. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 165.
437. See supra Part II.A (discussing how heuristics and biases can lead to systemic
cognitive errors, and, on a larger scale, can lead to blame cascades).
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the matters at issue.438 To similar effect, narratives can be met with
counternarratives, metaphors met with countermetaphors, and so on.
Agency strategies to avoid blame pose a different set of trade-offs. On the
one hand, delegation and complex partnering arrangements can cause
accountability trails to run cold, so that no one seems responsible when things
go wrong.439 Moreover, the dispersion of authority can lead to the problem
of “too many hands,” in which all players plausibly deny blame.440 On the
other hand, however, agency strategies designed to diffuse blame may have
positive (even if unintended) consequences. For instance, congressional
delegation or the creation of “cooperative federalism” arrangements may
lodge authority in institutions or officials that are better equipped to make
and implement policy.441 In addition, public-private partnerships and
intergovernmental arrangements can pool resources and information in ways
that enhance what the contributing partners could accomplish on their
own.442
Policy strategies designed to produce alibis can lead to laws and protocols
that are not in the public’s best interest.443 Even well-intended policy
strategies can inadvertently result in overall welfare loss, as in the
phenomenon of “iatrogenic risks”—the risks created by ostensibly riskreducing policies.444 Notwithstanding these generalized concerns, policy
strategies for avoiding blame can also have positive results and should be
valued to that extent. Under the right conditions, the impulse to avoid blame
might lead public officials to select better policies and practices. If “good”
policies attract less blame than “bad” policies, then officials may be inclined
toward good policies, whether anticipating or responding to institutional
blame. Of course, what qualifies as “good” or “bad” policy is beyond this

438. See Hood, supra note 3, at 167–68.
439. See Bovens et al., supra note 3, at 16 (“When public policies are the product of
difficult collaborations between many agents, private as well as public, it is more difficult to
deliver; more difficult to call to account; more difficult even to understand who we should
hold accountable.”).
440. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 174.
441. The term “cooperative federalism” generally connotes statutory arrangements in
which states implement a federally prescribed program or goal. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen &
Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1276 (2009) (arguing
that states enjoy considerable leverage in the position of uncooperative agent); Philip J.
Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV.
663, 672 (2001).
442. See HOOD, supra note 10, at 166.
443. See id. at 171.
444. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management,
9 RISK 39, 52 (1998). Although too soon to say, an example might be President Trump’s travel
bans. The Trump administration has touted each travel ban as a security-enhancing measure,
but some critics worry that the symbolic expressions of the bans will enhance recruitment
efforts of terrorist organizations and increase the risk of attack. See, e.g., Jessica Kwong,
Trump’s Travel Ban Helps ISIS Stage Attacks in the U.S., Democrats Say, NEWSWEEK
(Nov. 17, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/trumps-travel-ban-helps-isis-stage-attacks-usdemocrats-say-715512 [https://permacc/8WZK-N8KL].
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Article’s scope. But, as a general point, it must be appreciated that we often
blame public officials for “bad” policies so that we can get “good” ones.445
Nothing I have said is intended to minimize the ever-present dysfunctions
of blame attribution and blame avoidance. In the immigration context, as
elsewhere, blame can lead to irrational, counterproductive, painful, and
destructive behaviors. Indeed, these concerns may be especially acute for
immigration regulation. As history attests, migrants tend to be easy outlets
for blame.446 Moreover, for some public officials, it can be politically risky
not to blame certain categories of migrants. These phenomena of migrant
blame and institutional blame are not coincidental: they go hand in hand and
can pull in dangerous directions.
A main thrust of this Article, however, is to offer a partial rehabilitation.
Appreciating that immigration blame can be functional and dysfunctional
offers a fresh theoretical starting point. Future work can direct energy toward
promoting blame’s constructive possibilities, while reducing its pathologies.
In the next sections, I offer some preliminary thoughts toward those
symbiotic objectives.
C. Ethics of Immigration Blame
Immigration blame is cresting all around us, yet we have no principled way
to answer some fundamental questions. What distinguishes legitimate from
illegitimate blame attribution?
What distinguishes legitimate from
illegitimate blame avoidance? An “ethics of immigration blame,” proposed
here, speaks to these and related concerns.447 If followed, these ethical
precepts could improve the quality of blaming practices in the immigration
context (and beyond).
Even without formal legal sanctions, an ethics of immigration blame might
be realized through voluntary compliance and external pressures from peers,
principals, and voting constituencies. Although optimistic, it is not
unthinkable. We already do blame public officials and migrants for how they
attribute and avoid blame. Thus, the necessary instincts and motivations to
modulate blaming practices already exist. An ethics of immigration blame
445. If that is not our hope when we blame, then why do we blame public officials for
harmful policies?
446. See supra Part I.A.
447. The idea for an ethics of immigration blame is inspired by recent work in moral
philosophy. See generally BLAME: ITS NATURE AND NORMS, supra note 1 (collecting essays
on the nature and norms of blame). But an ethics of immigration blame must pick up where
moral philosophy leaves off. The moral philosophy literature is focused on blaming ethics in
the context of interpersonal relationships (e.g., friendships, families, and in other social
contexts). However, government authority and legal structures give rise to different
accountabilities and institutional roles, for which an ethics of immigration blame must
account. Cf. David Shoemaker, Blame and Punishment, in BLAME: ITS NATURE AND NORMS,
supra note 1, at 100, 100–01 (“[M]oral and legal blame have subtly but importantly different
structures and functions.”); Smith, supra note 1, at 34 (“[T]he type of blame that it is
appropriate for any particular individual to direct toward a blameworthy agent may vary
depending on that individual’s relation to the agent and other specific features of the
context.”).
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supplies what is missing—a normative framework of engagement. By
delineating a set of general and (I hope) agreeable principles, we will at least
have something to shoot for.
Two caveats before proceeding. First, I make no pretense that better
blaming practices will lead to better results. However, by improving the
dynamics of immigration blame, both the politics and outcomes may be more
acceptable. Surely, people will still disagree with the policies that emerge
from rhetorical wrangling; but the outcomes could be perceived as more
legitimate if reached through shared norms of engagement.
Second, to the extent that an ethics of immigration blame calls for pulling
punches, it may not be in any party’s strategic or ideological interest to
comply (especially if opponents defect from these principles to their own
advantage). Still, for many if not most Americans, there may be a greater
appetite for fairer play on the fields of immigration blame. An ethics of
immigration blame appeals to that demand and begins to chart a way forward.
1. Blaming Only Blameworthy Action
To start, blame should be reserved only for blameworthy action.
Straightforward as it seems, this basic principle is often honored in the
breach. A disquieting motif in immigration scholarship is that migrants
(especially of color) too often get blamed for nonblameworthy action.448
Meanwhile, a persistent complaint in public discourse is that
hyperpartisanship has led to unscrupulous finger-pointing among public
officials and institutions.449 An ethic that forecloses warrantless blame is
responsive to these concerns.
This ethic, however, does not resolve which behaviors are worthy of
blame. As earlier explained, that judgment generally turns on perceptions of
whether the blamee is responsible for an avoidable harm, and if so, whether
a compelling excuse or justification exists.450 Although a more fully
developed ethics of immigration blame might specify when these conditions
are met, I doubt doing so would add much value. For instance, all should
agree that it is clearly wrong to blame someone because of their race, and
448. See supra notes 7, 51–64, 153–56 and accompanying text.
449. See Zeke Miller et al., A Weekend of Finger-Pointing as Democrats, GOP Try to
Dodge Blame for Shutdown, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 21, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/
nationworld/politics/ct-federal-government-shutdown-20180120-story.html [https://perma.cc
/3LHF-PEU5] (“[L]awmakers were eager to show voters they were actively working for a
solution—or at least actively making their case why the other party was at fault.”); Alice
Rivlin, Opinion, Congress: Take a Timeout from Playing the Political Blame Game, HILL
(Jan. 29, 2018, 10:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/campaign/371181-congress-take-atimeout-from-playing-the-political-blame-game [https://perma.cc/6R4U-3399] (“A simple
timeout and a no-blaming pledge could be the first steps to restoring constructive national
policymaking.”); Press Release, Nat’l League of Cities, Cities Urge Congress to Stop Blame
Game, Do Its Job (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nlc.org/article/cities-urge-congress-to-stopblame-game-do-its-job [https://perma.cc/N7GP-ZLYT] (“For the sake of every person in
every city and town in America, Congress and the White House need to stop playing blame
games with the federal budget.”).
450. See supra notes 42–46, 241–48 and accompanying text.
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generally wrong to blame public officials for matters beyond their
jurisdiction or institutional role.451 In the former example, being of a certain
race is not a harm, much less an avoidable one, and is thus not blameworthy.
In the latter example, the absence of responsibility for some governmental
harm would negate the public official’s blameworthiness. In these and
countless other applications, the evaluative criteria of avoidable harm and
responsibility do most of the required work. It thus seems unnecessary to
delineate each and every iteration of warrantless blame, even if doing so were
possible.
Moreover, to my mind, resolving questions of blameworthiness should not
be the role of an ethics of immigration blame. Debates about whether blame
is warranted often turn on normative judgments—for example, whether the
putative harm is in fact a harm, or whether an excuse is compelling, or
whether an apology is sincere, or whether a certain institution (and not some
other) should have decisional authority over an issue. Shutting down such
conversations, in the name of an ethics of immigration blame, could
undermine the dialogic values of blame discussed above.452
2. Good-Faith Blaming
When blame carries sanctions (whether emotional, political, or legal), the
blamer should follow an ethic of good faith. At a minimum, this ethic
eschews the intentional misattribution of blame.453 Beyond that, a good-faith
ethic could filter out unintentional misattributions of blame by requiring that
the blamer: (1) not rush to judgment; (2) afford the blamee the benefit of the
doubt in close cases; (3) give fair consideration to a blamee’s excuse or
justification; and, more generally (4) account for the possibility of cognitive
errors, emotional influences, and epistemic uncertainty.454

451. It is not necessarily always wrong to blame public officials for matters outside of their
control. Blaming might be appropriate, for example, in situations where public officials
should be deemed accountable simply by virtue of their position in office. See infra note 453.
452. See supra Part IV.A.
453. Intentional misattribution of blame is almost never justified. From a utilitarian
perspective, however, a narrow exception to this general rule arguably applies when the
overall consequences of misattributed blame advance the public welfare. For example,
wrongly blaming a public official (say, an agency head) might protect the political fortunes of
other public officials (say, the president) who then might retain the necessary credibility to
pursue other welfare-enhancing policies. See ELLIS, supra note 239, at 1–2, 153, 182–83
(studying this phenomenon in the presidential context).
454. There are similar suggestions in moral philosophy. See Coates & Tognazzini, supra
note 237, at 22 (“[P]erhaps blame should have a threshold whereby we should not blame if
reasonable doubt exists over blameworthiness.”); Kelly, supra note 248, at 262 (calling for
interpretive generosity of the actions of others and the circumstances surrounding them, which
can “open[] possibilities for understanding, forgiveness, and an honest reckoning with faults
we might share”). An ethic of good faith that promotes fairness and factual accuracy links to
some of my legal prescriptions below. See infra Part V.D. In particular, administrative
processes that require transparency, reason giving, and open public participation are—all else
equal—more likely to generate the type of deliberation and investigation needed to counter
misattributed blame. See infra notes 488–97 and accompanying text.
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Some self-awareness, cognitive effort, and interpretive generosity toward
the actions and intentions of others, can go a long way toward countering
unwarranted misattributions of blame. These correctives are all within reach
because they are generally matters within our control. Emotional reactions,
snap judgments, and biases are natural to the way we process information
about the world around us. But, as recent studies show, these human
tendencies might be mediated and improved through self-awareness and
education.455
Manufactured blame cascades may lose their potency as more people
become attuned to what motivates and causes them. For example, if we are
aware that confirmation bias may cause us to discount inconvenient
information, we can expand our cognitive compass to accept new data and
perspectives.456 If we are aware that negativity bias may cause us to
subjectively inflate the significance of bad over good, we might push
ourselves to see matters in a more objective light, smoke out blame
entrepreneurs who prey on negativity, and seek opportunities to praise
deserving migrants and public officials.457 Aware that System One
tendencies can lead to scapegoating, our System Two may lead us to realize
that scapegoating allows the true source of psychic or social harm to go
unaddressed.458
To be sure, all of this is easier said than done. The point, however, is that
it can be done with intention.
3. Value-Based Blaming
To complement the foregoing, an ethic of “value-based blaming” would
require that a token of blame advance one or more of blame’s social values.
As explained above, those values include registering protest or condemnation
of wrongful behavior; motivating compliance with social, political, and legal
norms; and enriching collective thinking about what those norms are or
should be.459 In contexts where none of those values would be served, a
token of blame would have no legitimate social function.460 Thus, we might
455. See, e.g., David DeSteno et al., Beyond Valence in the Perception of Likelihood: The
Role of Emotion Specificity, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 397, 412 (2000). According
to studies by Dr. DeStano and others, emotional bias can be overcome under the right
circumstances. Such circumstances include (1) the realization that emotion might be
influencing objectivity of the speaker or audience; (2) the motivation to arrive at an objectively
accurate judgment; and (3) the ability and effort to think more deeply or differently about a
problem so as to overcome emotion-related effects. Id.
456. See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of confirmation
bias on judgment formation).
457. See supra notes 141–44 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of negativity
bias on judgment formation).
458. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text (discussing cognitive dissonance and
its relationship to scapegoating tendencies); see also DOUGLAS, supra note 37, at 67 (“[T]he
whole process of scapegoating . . . is not just one of evasion of responsibility but also one of
obscuring the essential problem.”).
459. See supra Part V.A.
460. Cf. Bell, supra note 423, at 272 (arguing, in a different context, that “blame is morally
appropriate when it is fitting and achieves at least one of its multiple aims”).
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conclude that blame is unnecessary, and probably inappropriate, in such
situations.461
4. Receiving Blame
Individuals and institutions can respond excellently or poorly when
targeted with blame. When blaming others is the blamee’s response, the
principles outlined above should apply. Thus, redirected blame should be
warranted, made in good faith, and serve one or more of blame’s instrumental
values.462
Further, a blamee should at least consider a blamer’s allegations and,
ideally, reflect seriously on the charge.463 To be clear, the blamee need not
accept the criticism or complaint. But blamees who reflexively deny blame
can miss something important about their own behavior and forfeit the
opportunity for remediation or improvement.
*

*

*

If followed, the foregoing principles would set a new benchmark for how
blame is practiced and experienced. Almost everything we know about
people outside of our social and professional circles is shaped by others (e.g.,
politicians, pundits, colleagues, the media) who have incentives to provide
whatever information will elicit the intended reaction (e.g., outrage,
sympathy, sorrow).464 Escaping those influences is not easy, owing to
informational asymmetries, cognitive biases, and reputational concerns. But
we generally can control how we react to others’ attempts to dole out and
avoid blame.465 Moreover, how we personally dole out blame, avoid blame,
and assist others in these regards are certainly within reach.
D. Legalistic Nudges
To complement an ethics of immigration blame, the law might be
leveraged to neutralize some of blame’s downsides. There are important
limitations, however, to any legalistic approach. Most notably, such
prescriptions must account for existing legal structures that, in all probability,
cannot be reengineered for blame’s sake. The First Amendment’s Free
461. To be sure, judgments about whether a particular token of blame serves a valuable
function will often be contested. Most notably, a blamer may see value in blaming where
others do not. There is no easy way around this puzzle. One way to address it, however, is
through a rebuttable presumption: a token of blame might be deemed presumptively proper
when, from an objective standpoint, one or more of blame’s values are reasonably advanced.
462. See supra notes 449–60 and accompanying text (calling for these ethical norms).
463. See Bell, supra note 423, at 279–80.
464. See supra Part II; cf. Barbara Fried, Forum: Beyond Blame, BOS. REV. (June 28,
2013),
http://bostonreview.net/forum/barbara-fried-beyond-blame-moral-responsibilityphilosophy-law [https://perma.cc/3U5M-DZSG] (making a similar point and eschewing
blame on metaphysical grounds).
465. Cf. Shaun Nichols, After Incompatibilism: A Naturalistic Defense of the Reactive
Attitudes, 21 PHIL. PERSP. 405, 412 (2007) (distinguishing between narrow-profile emotional
responses, which are local or immediate emotional reactions to situations, and wide-profile
responses, which are not immediate and can involve rational reflection).
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Speech Clause is an important example.466 Narratives, metaphors, excuses,
justifications, and so on, may be preposterous, misleading, and offensive.
Still, they generally will be constitutionally protected forms of speech and
thus beyond regulatory controls.467 Therefore, any attempt to directly
regulate blaming statements and presentational blame-avoiding tactics will
generally be unavailing.
A more promising approach would focus on agency and policy strategies
for avoiding blame.468 Because these blame-avoidance strategies are
undertaken by government officials through the medium of law, they may
also be more conducive to legalistic nudges. For example, agency strategies
to avoid blame through delegation and governmental partnerships generally
depend on legal warrants to do so. Likewise, policy strategies to avoid blame
often take the form of hard or soft law.469 These and related blame-avoidance
tactics, which generally depend on the law for their implementation, are
potentially ripe for regulatory controls in ways that presentational tactics are
not.
1. Agency Strategies
Agency strategies that tangle lines of accountability may engender
unproductive, and potentially disruptive, immigration blame games. To
counter those effects, lines of accountability might be simplified through
legal doctrine and statutory design. To be clear, the suggestion here is not
that delegations and governmental partnering be forbidden: those design
choices pervade our legal system, often with good intentions and effect.
Rather, the suggestion is that when those design choices are made, the
resulting lines of accountability can facilitate or fluster ascriptions of
institutional blame.
All else equal, institutional blame will be more productive when lines of
governmental accountability are clear and stable, rather than opaque and
shifty. First, clear lines of accountability are needed for the polity to know
which public officials are responsible for which public harms. In turn, public
officials—knowing they will be on the hook for perceived harms—may be
more inclined to act responsibly, ex ante, to avoid being blamed ex post.
Second, stable lines of responsibility will also generally enhance the efficacy
of institutional blame. When the lines of accountability are unstable, or
flimsy, public officials can too easily escape attributions of institutional
blame.
466. U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting free speech and ideas).
467. Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 458 (2011) (“[S]peech cannot be restricted simply
because it is upsetting or arouses contempt.”).
468. See supra Part III.B–C (discussing these blame-avoidance strategies by public
officials).
469. By soft law, I mean to refer to government policies that are not formally binding but
that nevertheless control or influence how government authority is exercised. For example,
DACA and DAPA would fall into the category of soft law because they were formed outside
of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, and they ostensibly do not create rights or
duties. See DAPA Memo, supra note 225; DACA Memo, supra note 225.
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As discussed further below, clear and stable lines of accountability are not
a panacea, as those conditions may simply lead public officials to other,
potentially more acute, forms of blame avoidance.470 But if tighter
accountability is worth pursuing to close at least some blame-avoidance
spigots, then the Supreme Court’s exceptional immigration doctrines are
prime candidates for reconsideration.
Start with the plenary power doctrine. The Court has yet to clearly
delineate the scope of the Executive’s immigration powers vis-à-vis
Congress.471 In contrast to the type of clear and stable delegations idealized
above, the lawmaking relationship between Congress and the Executive in
the immigration context is rather opaque.472 It is characterized more by
“de facto delegation” than formal delegations.473 That leaves important
questions unanswered about which federal institutions are responsible, and
thus which to blame, for the egregious mismatch between Congress’s “laws
on the books” and the “law in action.”474
To this concern, Article II’s Take Care Clause offers some residual
promise.475 To wit, the Court might interpret this provision to create
substantive limits on the Executive’s discretionary authority. The metes and
bounds of what that doctrine should be, or could be, has been debated at

470. There are two reasons for this. First, greater accountability can lead public officials
toward other forms of blame avoidance (such as presentational or policy strategies) which may
be even harder to control. Second, and relatedly, too much accountability, or the wrong type
of it, can stultify creative and efficient governance. See Christopher Hood, Accountability and
Transparency: Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, Awkward Couple?, 33 W. EUR. POL. 989, 992
(2010) (“[F]ormal transparency requirements tend to lead to low-intelligence defensive boxticking and one-way communication rather than real answerability in effective dialogue.”).
471. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 133–34 (2015); Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 609–
12 (discussing this gap in the Court’s immigration jurisprudence).
472. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L.J. 458, 476–78, 485 (2009).
473. Id. at 485 (explaining that “the intricate rule-like provisions of the immigration code,
which on their face appear to limit executive discretion, actually have had the effect of
delegating tremendous authority to the President to set the screening rules for immigrants—
that is, to decide on the composition of the immigrant community”); see also MOTOMURA,
supra note 51, at 21–22, 53.
474. See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 116
(2013) (“The law on the books is different from the law in action, and enforcement is a vital
part of law’s identity as law.”); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 51, at 50–55 (explaining how
the gap between Congress’s immigration laws—law on the books—and executive
enforcement—law in action—creates the conditions for arbitrary and racialized enforcement
practices).
475. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Incidentally, the Article I nondelegation doctrine is almost
certainly not the answer, given how liberally the Court applies the doctrine. See Thomas W.
Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004) (noting the “difficulty of squaring” the postulate that
“Congress may not delegate legislative power[] with the fact that Congress has massively
delegated legislative rulemaking authority to administrative agencies”).
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length in the literature476 and, in the DAPA litigation, was left undecided by
the Supreme Court.477
A blame lens offers new perspective. Interpreting the Take Care Clause
in accountability-enhancing ways can promote more accurate ascriptions of
institutional blame. In turn, more efficacious blaming may lead to more
responsible laws “on the books” (by Congress) and “in action” (by the
Executive). Again, the emphasis on may here is important: limiting agency
strategies can simply lead to other forms of institutional blame avoidance—
namely, presentational and policy strategies. Thus, shoring up lines of
accountability may be a start, but it no way guarantees better results.
To see how, return to the amnesty example. Over this subject, the lines of
institutional accountability are reasonably clear and stable: only Congress
can decide whether to legalize undocumented migrants. As reflected in
today’s amnesty debates, however, that accountability does not necessarily
portend rational or desirable policies. Fully accountable legislators might
manage their risk of institutional blame through policy strategies that are
responsive (or overresponsive) to the perceptions (or misperceptions) of their
key constituents.478 In this and other examples, it is blame-avoidance policy
strategies—not agency strategies—that may pose the greater challenge.
2. Policy Strategies
When immigration policies are crafted to avoid blame, they may not be
economically, pragmatically, or normatively rational. Again, adjustments to
the Court’s plenary power doctrine might indirectly help, but this time in a
different way. Rather than (or in addition to) shoring up lines of
accountability, the plenary power doctrine might be adjusted to limit the
range of blame-avoiding policies available to the federal political branches.
As currently applied, the Court’s plenary power doctrine relaxes
constitutional limits on federal immigration laws.479 In turn, this affords
Congress and the Executive more maneuverability to design policies with an
eye toward avoiding blame. If the Court brings the plenary power doctrine

476. For contrasting views on what the Take Care Clause entails, or should entail, in
regards to executive enforcement discretion, compare Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 471, at
174–77, which eschews hard constitutional limits on the president’s enforcement authority,
with Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 781, 784–85 (2013), and Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive
Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 759–60 (2014), both of which argue that the Take Care Clause
limits the president’s enforcement discretion.
477. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) (affirming, without
opinion, the Fifth Circuit’s preliminary injunction of DAPA in Texas v. United States, 805
F.3d 653, 657 (5th Cir. 2015)).
478. See supra Part IV.C.1.
479. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
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in line with mainstream constitutional norms, some of the most concerning
federal immigration policies might be taken off the table.480
I have already discussed how that is arguably the case for President
Trump’s travel bans.481 If not for the Court’s overweening deference to
Congress and the Executive, the enabling statute and the travel bans might
never have been crafted, much less survived judicial review in Trump v.
Hawaii.
Consider also Jennings v. Rodriguez,482 which the Supreme Court recently
remanded to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.483 At issue in
Jennings is the constitutionality of statutes that require the detention of
certain categories of migrants, without the opportunity for bond, even if the
migrants pose no flight risk or danger to the community.484 This detention
scheme is unmatched anywhere else in domestic U.S. law.485 Were the Court
to apply its mainstream due process principles, rather than the highly
deferential plenary power doctrine, this detention scheme would most likely
be unconstitutional.486 Indeed, but for the enabling plenary power doctrine,
the statutory scheme may never have been created in the first place.
The same ideas hold when moving from constitutional rights to
constitutional structure. Ongoing litigation over the sanctuary city
movement involves unsettled questions about formal immigration
responsibility between Congress and the Executive, on the one hand, and
between federal and subfederal officials on the other.487 Depending on how
those structural issues are resolved, certain policy options—both federal and
local—may be taken off the table.
Again, I cannot say with certainty that any of the policies in the foregoing
examples were undertaken to avoid institutional blame. Nor do I mean to
take a position here on the legal or normative merits of the policies under
review. Rather, these examples are offered to illustrate a generalizable
480. Cf. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 630–38 (explaining how and why
adjustments to the plenary power doctrine would not lead to predictable or easily controlled
policy outcomes).
481. See supra notes 95–105, 405–07 and accompanying text.
482. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018).
483. Id. at 836 (holding that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c) do not give detained
aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention, and that the
Ninth Circuit misapplied the canon of constitutional avoidance in holding otherwise).
484. See id.
485. See Kevin Johnson, Argument Analysis: Justices Seem Primed to Find Constitutional
Limits on the Detention of Immigrants, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 4, 2017),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/argument-analysis-justices-seem-primed-findconstitutional-limits-detention-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/M2UW-BU7H].
Ahilan
Arulanantham of the ACLU, arguing the case for the immigrants, said “this Court has never
authorized detention without a hearing before a neutral decision-maker, outside of national
security, beyond six months.” Id.
486. See Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 19, at 596; see also Rubenstein, supra
note 91.
487. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–3, 12, City & County of San
Francisco v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) (arguing that the
Trump administration’s attempt to deny San Francisco certain federal funding because of the
city’s policies violated principles of both federalism and separation of powers).
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dynamic: namely, how adjustments to the Court’s doctrines could have
downstream effects on the policy choices available to officials across all
levels of government. The policy options taken off the table would include
blame-avoiding policies.
Apart from the Court’s exceptional immigration doctrines, administrative
law offers additional legalistic levers. Courts can hardly be expected to
identify and invalidate regulatory policies merely for being products of
immigration blame. Under the Court’s “hard look” doctrine, however,
regulators are required to demonstrate that their policies are rationally
conceived and take due regard for available facts and alternative approaches
to regulatory problems.488 Depending on how rigorously courts apply this
standard, ill-advised policy strategies for avoiding institutional blame may
be indirectly tempered.489
Along similar lines, irrational agency decisions might be countered by
administrative processes that require transparency and offer a wider set of
public viewpoints. Toward that end, administrative law doctrines (which are
notoriously fuzzy with respect to certain procedural exemptions),490 could be
clarified and tweaked to channel more administrative decisions toward
notice-and-comment rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).491
For notice-and-comment rulemaking, the APA requires the agency to
provide advance notice of its proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register
and offer interested parties the opportunity to submit written comments in
response.492 Moreover, to enable meaningful public comments, courts have
required the agency to make its intentions clearly known in the notice of
rulemaking.493 Finally, although the APA textually requires that a final
regulation be accompanied by “a concise general statement of [the
regulation’s] basis and purpose,”494 courts generally require the agency to
respond to all significant comments received and to explain its decisions
rather thoroughly.495

488. See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (“No regulation is
‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good.” (emphasis added)); Judulang v.
Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 64 (2011) (“We must reverse an agency policy when we cannot discern
a reason for it.”); see also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983) (establishing that courts must take a hard look at agencies’ reasons for
action and inaction).
489. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
490. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311,
1312 n.2 (1992); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 894–
96 (2004).
491. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2012).
492. Id. § 553(b).
493. See, e.g., NRDC v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2002).
494. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
495. See, e.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir.
1997); see also Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (requiring
an agency to respond to “comments which, if true . . . would require a change in [the] agency’s
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To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that considerations of blame
dynamics should necessarily tip the scales in long-running debates on
administrative law’s optimal design. My more modest point is that generally
accepted tropes of “good” governance—such as accountability,
transparency, deliberation, and expertise—can also create obstacles to “bad”
forms of policy blame avoidance.
CONCLUSION
More than just relevant, blame has transfiguring effects on the immigration
system’s operation and design. Although we might conceive of a society
without immigration blame, it is not ours. Nor should we want one. The
nature and norms of immigration blame are things to improve, not stamp out
wholesale.
There are any number of directions that future work might take. First, the
theoretical model offered here could benefit from empirical testing. For
example, polling numbers and experiments might be used to test correlations
between migrant blame and institutional blame. Anecdotally, there seem to
be strong correlations in the contexts studied here. Empirical testing might
offer important refinements and extensions.
Second, this Article’s study of immigration blame can be complemented
by an orthogonal study of “immigration praise.” I have focused here on
blame, rather than praise, because blame seems more potent and salient to
current conditions. Moreover, as earlier explained, negativity bias helps to
explain why blame generally dominates over praise as a social, political, and
legal catalyst.496 That said, praise undoubtedly has a place in the immigration
system. One can easily identify instances of migrant praise, institutional
praise, praise attribution, and praise seeking. How these praise dynamics
interact with each other, and with their foils in immigration blame, are
subjects that warrant further study.497
Third, this Article’s normative and prescriptive treatments of immigration
blame are hardly meant to be the last word. I have outlined what an ethics of
immigration blame should entail. Further, I have offered some preliminary
thoughts on how legal doctrines and structures might be leveraged to promote
the values of blame, while countering some of its more unsavory effects.
Space did not allow for more, but surely more might be said. This Article
proposed rule” (first alteration in original) (quoting ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1581 (D.C.
Cir. 1987))).
496. Cf. Baumeister et al., supra note 139, at 354–55 (describing how bad dominates good
across multiple cognitive and social settings); Weaver, supra note 13, at 374 (explaining that,
owing to negativity bias, voters are more likely to mobilize out of protest than out of
satisfaction); see also GARY WATSON, AGENCY AND ANSWERABILITY 283 (2004) (arguing that
praise is not the mirror image of blame, in part because the negative force of blame generally
prompts more intense and consequential reactions than praise); supra notes 320–21 and
accompanying text (discussing how negativity bias may be factoring into debates over
comprehensive immigration reform).
497. I am currently exploring these subjects, in a piece tentatively titled “Immigration
Praise.”
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has provided the vocabulary and vision. But what immigration blame ought
to be is a shared responsibility. Future generations will rightly blame us if
we do not try for better.

